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Up Against the Wall: Congressional Retention of the
Spending Power in Times of “Emergency”
Linda Sheryl Greene*
President Trump’s border wall has evolved from an ambitious campaign
promise into a real opportunity to explore presidential versus Congressional
authority to determine how the president spends Congressionally
appropriated funds. The president’s arguments that he has the power to
build the wall under either the National Emergencies Act or the funding
provisions of 10 U.S.C. § 9705 or 10 U.S.C. § 284 lack merit—the cited nonemergency-tied statutes do not provide funding for the wall. The former
authorizes the utilization of Treasury Forfeiture funds tied to specific law
enforcement activities but excludes the ambitious and broad construction
project the president proposed; the latter authorizes support only for
counterdrug activities. The wall constitutes an unprecedented appropriation
for a project without mooring in statutory language permitting only
unspecified minor military construction projects.
Nor does The National Emergencies Act authorize the president to use
Congressionally appropriated funds to build a wall that congress has
expressly declined to fund. Congress enacted the National Emergencies Act
after Executive abuses during the Vietnam War and to curb—not
encourage—presidential usurpation of Congressional spending power
based on emergency rationales. Although the National Emergencies Act
imposes scant substantive and procedural limitations on a president’s ability
to declare a national emergency and divert funds to address such an
emergency, the Act does not allow the president to manufacture a basis for
such a declaration where none exists. Even so, the chronology of events
leading up to the emergency declaration demonstrates that the president’s
invocation of an emergency is a ruse.
Additionally, the president’s Executive Order cites 10 U.S.C. § 2808,
which requires the declaration of a national emergency under the National
Emergencies Act. That Act authorizes a president to undertake “military
construction projects” when he declares a national emergency in
accordance with that Act. But Section 2808 only applies where a national
* Evjue Bascom Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School, J.D. Berkeley Law. I thank my
research Assistant Charles Urena (2019), and my research Librarian Genevieve Zook for their
invaluable assistance on this project.
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emergency “requires the use of the armed forces” and only authorizes
military construction projects “necessary to support such use of the armed
forces.” The statutory language of 10 U.S.C. § 2808 makes it clear that
effectuating immigration policy does not qualify as a military construction.
It has been long settled that presidential power must stem from an act of
Congress or from the president’s own Article II powers. That dictum need
not deprive a president of flexibility in the execution of powers delegated to
her by Congress or in the execution of power delegated to her by the
Constitution. Neither the foreign affairs power to recognize nations nor
Commander in Chief authority to repel sudden attacks authorize the
president to spend funds appropriated by Congress for other purposes. The
Constitution did delegate to Congress the power to “provide for the common
defense and general welfare” of the United States with the proviso that “no
money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by law.” That provision does not deprive Congress of
the flexibility to delegate power to the president, but here Congress did not
authorize these expenditures and expressly declined to provide funding for
“the Wall” on two occasions. Thus, the president’s use of Congressionally
appropriated funds to build “his Wall” is in conflict with Congress’s will
and unlawful. So far, though lower courts have agreed with this result, a
Supreme Court stay of the decision that enjoined the use of Defense
Department funds in effect permits the president to finalize contracts and
begin wall construction pending the resolution of the dispute on the merits
in the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court. In its short decision that granted
the stay, the Supreme Court signaled that if the case arrives via certiorari
and the Court grants review, a majority will conclude that the Sierra Club
plaintiffs have “no cause of action.” If that transpires, the favorable outcome
for the president will turn on the nature of the litigants not the legality of the
Wall construction project. For those concerned with the preservation of
constitutional limitations on the Executive, “better half a loaf than none at
all.”1
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1. So far, plaintiffs have filed seven lawsuits challenging Trump’s national emergency
declaration.
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INTRODUCTION: FUNDING THE PRESIDENT’S PREROGATIVES
The idea that Congress must fund the executive’s prerogatives is, as
Zachary Price puts it, “off the table.”2 Although debated early in
America’s history,3 and suggested occasionally since,4 “the great weight
2. Zachary S. Price, Funding Restrictions and Separation of Powers, 71 VAND. L. REV. 357,
382 (2018).
3. The issue arose as early as 1774. At the same time, however, Congress did not take
Washington’s invitation to promote “science and literature” either “by affording aids to seminaries
of learning already established” or “by the institution of a national university.” David P. Currie,
The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress, 1789–91, 61 U. CHI. L.
REV. 775, 799 (1994) (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 970 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement
of Representatives Madison and Page)).
4. See, e.g., Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1350–51 (1988).
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of historical practice contradicts it.”5 In fact, in the earliest years of the
Republic, many members of Congress quickly adopted the view that “the
general power of granting money, also vested in Congress, would at all
events be used, if necessary, as a check upon, and as controlling the
exercise of the powers claimed by the President and the Senate.”6 This
check is generally accepted today as an essential component of the
separation of powers. How, then, may a president fulfill campaign
promises in situations where Congress has expressly refused to
appropriate the funds that he has asked for?
President Trump found an answer to this question in the form of a
highly publicized and sensationalized declaration of a national
emergency. The president campaigned on constructing a “great, great
wall” on the United States-Mexico border7 and took steps to prepare for
that construction early in his presidency, 8 but had trouble securing
congressional funding to build it—even when his party controlled both
chambers of congress. In the third year of his presidency, the longest
government shutdown in United States history ended with congressional
authorization of about one-quarter of the funding that the president had
requested.9
Although many considered this turn of events a major loss for the
administration, the president countered by declaring a national
5. Price, supra note 2, at 382.
6. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 466 (1796) (statement of Albert Gallatin). This view is widely adopted
today. See Price, supra note 2, at 382 (discussing whether Congress’s power of the purse comes
with strings attached); Stith, supra note 4, at 1344 (describing Congress’s power of the purse).
7. Donald J. Trump, 2016 Presidential Announcement Speech (June 16, 2015) [hereinafter
Trump Presidential Announcement Speech] (transcript available at http://time.com/3923128/
donald-trump-announcement-speech/ [https://perma.cc/AJ3T-JSEN]).
8. In Executive Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8793 (Jan. 27, 2017), “Border Security
and Immigration Enforcement Improvements,” the president cited the powers vested in him by the
Constitution as well as three statutes to undertake numerous policies “to ensure the safety and
territorial integrity of the United States as well as to ensure that the Nation’s immigration laws are
faithfully executed,” including “the immediate construction of a physical wall on the southern
border . . . .” Environmental groups unsuccessfully challenged the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) decision to waive applicable environmental laws in the course of the installation of
“additional physical barriers and road . . . in the vicinity of the United States border” that DHS
contended were authorized by Section 102a of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). In re Border Infrastructure Envtl. Litig., 284 F. Supp. 3d
1092, 1104, 1119–20 (S.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d, Border Infrastructure Envtl. Litig. v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 915 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2019). The Ninth Circuit concluded that both the projects
and the environmental law waivers were specifically authorized by the IIRIRA. 915 F.3d. at 1226.
9. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-6, § 230, 133 Stat. 13, 28 (providing
$1.375 billion, less than one quarter of the $5.7 billion sought); Mihir Zaveri, Guilbert Gates &
Karen Zraick, The Government Shutdown Was the Longest Ever. Here’s the History., N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/09/us/politics/longest-governmentshutdown.html [https://perma.cc/952N-VLYC].
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emergency at the southern border.10 Invoking his authority under the
National Emergency Act (NEA), which authorizes the president to
“declare [a] national emergency,”11 the proclamation detailed:
The current situation at the southern border presents a border security
and humanitarian crisis that threatens core national security interests
and constitutes a national emergency. The southern border is a major
entry point for criminals, gang members, and illicit narcotics. The
problem of large-scale unlawful migration through the southern border
is long-standing, and despite the executive branch’s exercise of existing
statutory authorities, the situation has worsened in certain respects in
recent years. In particular, recent years have seen sharp increases in the
number of family units entering and seeking entry to the United States
and an inability to provide detention space for many of these aliens
while their removal proceedings are pending. If not detained, such
aliens are often released into the country and are often difficult to
remove from the United States because they fail to appear for hearings,
do not comply with orders of removal, or are otherwise difficult to
locate. In response to the directive in my April 4, 2018, memorandum
and subsequent requests for support by the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the Department of Defense has provided support and
resources to the Department of Homeland Security at the southern
border. Because of the gravity of the current emergency situation, it is
necessary for the Armed Forces to provide additional support to address
the crisis.12

At the same time, the White House issued additional information
regarding the declaration in a “fact sheet,” which stated that “the
Administration [had] so far identified up to $8.1 billion that will be
available to build the border wall once a national emergency is
declared.”13 Specifically, the White House laid out three funding sources
to be used sequentially: (1) “[a]bout $601 million from the Treasury
Forfeiture Fund”; (2) “[u]p to $2.5 billion under the Department of
Defense funds transferred for Support for Counterdrug Activities”; and
(3) “[u]p to $3.6 billion reallocated from Department of Defense military
construction projects under the president’s declaration of a national
emergency.”14
Many legal scholars were quick to criticize the declaration. Yale Law
Professor Bruce Ackerman wrote that diverting military funds to pay for
10. Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4949, 4949 (Feb. 20, 2019).
11. National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976).
12. Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. at 4949.
13. President Donald J. Trump’s Border Security Victory, NAT’L SEC. & DEF. FACT SHEETS
(Feb. 15, 2019) [hereinafter Border Security Fact Sheet], https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/president-donald-j-trumps-border-security-victory [https://perma.cc/NW4D-Y5VH].
14. Id.
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a wall and the use of the military would not only be illegal, but that
“members of the armed forces [who] obeyed [President Trump’s]
command” to build such a wall “would be committing a federal crime.”15
Susan Hennessey, a Senior Fellow in National Security in Governance
Studies at the Brookings Institution, wrote that “for the president to
transparently abuse the emergency discretion granted by statute and for
Congress to accede to that abuse is an exceptionally grave signal of
serious structural breakdown.”16 Moreover, Boston University
International Law Scholar Robert Sloane characterized the declaration as
“an effort to get one’s way outside the ordinary political and legal
processes . . . [that] gradually erodes the shared norms that sustain our
constitutional democracy.”17
Democratic members of Congress also pushed back. For example,
House Democratic Caucus Chairman Hakeem Jeffries claimed that
Congress’s “power of the purse . . . has been invaded by Donald
Trump.”18 Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi released a statement
finding that “[t]he President’s sham emergency declaration and unlawful
transfers of funds have undermined our democracy, contravening the vote
of the bipartisan Congress, the will of the American people and the letter
of the Constitution.”19 Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer
characterized a potential declaration as “a lawless act, a gross abuse of
the power of the presidency, and a desperate attempt to distract from the
fact that President Trump broke his core promise to have Mexico pay for
the wall.”20 He continued, “[i]t will be another demonstration of
President Trump’s naked contempt for the rule of law and congressional
authority.”21

15. Bruce Ackerman, No, Trump Cannot Declare an ‘Emergency’ to Build His Wall, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/05/opinion/no-trump-cannot-declare-anemergency-to-build-his-wall.html [https://perma.cc/9AQP-97CX].
16. Andrew Rudalevige, Does Trump Really Have ‘Absolute Power’ to Declare a National
Emergency? Let’s Examine the Statute., WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.washington
post.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/01/10/does-trump-really-have-absolute-power-to-declarea-national-emergency-lets-examine-the-statute/ [https://perma.cc/KX2H-5RVJ].
17. Rich Barlow, Is Trump’s Declaration of a National Emergency Constitutional?, BU TODAY
(Feb. 20, 2019), http://www.bu.edu/articles/2019/is-trumps-declaration-of-a-national-emergencyconstitutional [https://perma.cc/7CGK-KDH3].
18. Deirdre Walsh, Trump’s National Emergency Stands as House Fails to Override Veto, NPR
(Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/26/706843365/ trumps-national-emergency-standsas-house-fails-to-override-veto [https://perma.cc/C4FE-R7Y8].
19. Press Release, Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, House of Reps., Pelosi Statement on House’s
Intention to File Lawsuit to Block the President’s Transfer of Funds for His Ineffective, Wasteful
Wall (Apr. 4. 2019), https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/4419-2/ [https://perma.cc/B54Q-GN3N].
20. 165 CONG. REC. S1365 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2019) (statement of Sen. Schumer).
21. Id.
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Congressional condemnation was not limited to Democrats. Thirteen
House Republicans and twelve Senate Republicans voted for a joint
resolution to overturn the national emergency. 22 Many of these members
of Congress cited political reasons, primarily refusing to give Trump a
power that they would not want to see a future democratic president
hold.23 But others voted for the resolution because they did not believe
the president had the authority to make such an emergency declaration:
For the Executive Branch to override a law passed by Congress would
make it the ultimate power rather than a balancing power . . . We
experienced a similar erosion of congressional authority with President
Obama’s unilateral immigration orders—which I strenuously opposed.
In the case before us now, where Congress has enacted specific policy,
to consent to an emergency declaration would be both inconsistent with
my beliefs and contrary to my oath to defend the Constitution.24

Of course, not all House and Senate Republicans voted to overturn the
national emergency, either believing it was constitutional or placing what
they believe to be an important policy move over their beliefs of what the
Constitution and federal statutes allow.
Despite its current salience, no scholarship focuses directly on the
NEA’s applicability where Congress has expressly said no first and its
relation to a domestic policy. This is unsurprising, as it appears as though
no president in history has cited the NEA to sidestep the congressional
appropriations process after Congress has expressly declined to fund a
proposed presidential domestic program. This article explores the NEA’s
applicability, through a separation of powers lens, in just these situations
22. H.R.J. Res. 46, 116th Cong. (2019). House Representatives Amash (MI), Fitzpatrick (PA),
Gallagher (WI), Massie (KY), Johnson (SD), Hurd (TX), Herrera Beutler (CA), Rodgers (WA),
Rooney (FL), Sensenbrenner (WI), Stefanik (NY), Upton (MI), and Walden (OR) joined the joint
resolution. 165 CONG. REC. H2217–18 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2019) (relating, through Roll Vote no.
94, to a national emergency declared by the president on February 15, 2019). Overall, the measure
passed 245-182 in the House, with 5 not voting. Id. In the Senate, Senators Alexander (TN),
Portman (OH), Romney (UT), Blunt (MO), Rubio (FL), Collins (ME), Lee (UT), Toomey (PA),
Moran (KS), Murkowski (AK), Wicker (MS), and Paul (KY) all voted to overturn the national
emergency. 165 CONG. REC. S1882 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2019) (relating, through Roll Vote no. 49,
to a national emergency declared by the president on February 15, 2019). In the Senate, the measure
passed 59-41. Id.; see also H.R.J. Res. 46 (terminating the national emergency declared on Feb. 15,
2019).
23. Tennessee Senator Lamar Alexander said he supported the border wall, but voted on a
resolution to overturn the president’s emergency declaration, claiming “this declaration is a
dangerous precedent.” Sen. Lamar Alexander, Why I Am Voting Against Donald Trump’s State of
Emergency Declaration, TENNESSEAN (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.tennessean.com/story/
opinion/2019/03/14/lamar-alexander-emergency-declaration-vote-donald-trump/3161542002/
[https://perma.cc/RZJ3-H7GV].
24. Veronica Stracqualursi & Dana Bash, Romney Says He’ll Vote to Block Trump’s National
Emergency Declaration, CNN (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/14/ politics/
mitt-romney-resolution-trump-national-emergency/index.html [https://perma.cc/MPM6-ZPUP].
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and concludes that President Trump has exceeded any express or implied
authority he may have.
Part II describes the metamorphosis of candidate Trump’s “moonshot”
campaign promise to have Mexico pay for the construction of a “great,
great wall” into a constitutional controversy over presidential usurpation
of Congressional appropriation authority.
In Part III, I explore the president’s assertions of statutory authority to
fund the Wall based on the NEA, the Treasury Forfeiture Fund,25 and the
counterdrug activities provision of 10 U.S.C. § 284.26 Neither the
Treasury Forfeiture Fund nor § 284 require a presidential declaration for
their utilization of the NEA. I conclude that neither the Treasury
Forfeiture Fund nor § 284 provide a basis for President Trump’s southern
border wall because of their textual limitations. Next, I conclude that the
scope of the congressional delegation to the president under the NEA
must be read against its intent and prior presidential utilization. I conclude
that the NEA’s broadly-worded text grants the president wide discretion
in declaring an emergency, but President Trump’s declaration extends far
beyond what the statute allows. The NEA’s substantive limits require at
least an emergency. Although “emergency” is not defined in the statute,
historical and common understandings of the term invoke notions of
foreseeability and urgency. The national emergency that President Trump
declared was neither unforeseen nor urgent, considering his own
comments that he “did not need” to declare it. Moreover, prior
presidential utilizations of the NEA provide no precedent for the wall.
Instead, President Trump’s invocation of the NEA is inconsistent with
Congress’s intent to forbid presidents from using national emergency
declarations to usurp congressional appropriations power.
Part IV addresses the constitutional considerations. This discussion
necessarily requires an examination of Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Company v. Sawyer, in which the Supreme Court invalidated President
Truman’s attempt to nationalize steel mills to prevent labor strikes.
Youngstown dictates that the executive’s power is at its lowest when
Congress has expressly said no.27 Part IV also discusses the unique
political history surrounding President Trump’s declaration of a national
emergency—including the long back-and-forth between the president
and Congress, which demonstrates Congress’s disapproval of the border
wall. President Trump’s attempt to sidestep congressional authority over
appropriations is an attempt to “aggrandize” the executive’s power at the
expense of Congress’s constitutional power to control appropriations.
25. 31 U.S.C. § 9705(a) (2019).
26. 10 U.S.C. § 284(a), (a)(1)(A) (2019).
27. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952).
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Although the emergency powers Congress conferred under the NEA are
broad, the statute was conceived as a limitation on the president’s
authority to redirect funds Congress has appropriated for other purposes.
Thus, the NEA is not “congressional approval” under Youngstown where
Congress has addressed the specific appropriation request and withheld
authority. The president’s actions are unconstitutional.
In an Epilogue, this Article notes that although so far the lower federal
courts agree with the above view, the Supreme Court has already stayed
an important ruling that enjoined the wall construction and has signaled
that it will side with the president. It will reach that result not because the
president acted lawfully but because a set of plaintiffs who prevailed
below had no right to sue.
I. BREAKING DOWN THE HISTORY OF A “GREAT, GREAT WALL”28
A wall spanning the southern border has evolved from an ambitious
campaign goal into a politically divisive feature of President Trump’s
domestic policy agenda. The wall was integral to President Trump’s
announcement of his candidacy on June 16, 2015,29 throughout the 2016
campaign,30 and to his victory speech.31 In the third presidential debate,
he infamously explained, “[w]e have to keep the drugs out of our country.
Right now, we’re getting the drugs, they’re getting the cash. . . . Now, I
want to build the wall. We need the wall. The border patrol, I.C.E., they
all want the wall.”32 He justified the need for the wall by discussing drugs
that come through the border: “We stop the drugs; we shore up the
border . . . we have some bad hombres here and we’re going to get them
out.”33 At his inauguration he said, “[w]e must protect our borders from
the ravages of other countries making our products, stealing our
companies, and destroying our jobs. Protection will lead to great
prosperity and strength.”34 Once president, Trump immediately scaled
28. Trump Presidential Announcement Speech, supra note 7.
29. Id. (“I would build a great wall, and nobody builds walls better than me, believe me, and I’ll
build them very inexpensively, I will build a great, great wall on our southern border. And I will
have Mexico pay for that wall.”).
30. See generally The Third Presidential Debate: Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump (NBC
television broadcast Oct. 19, 2016) [hereinafter The Third Presidential Debate],
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=smkyorC5qwc [https://perma.cc/2VFF-C7ZP] (transcript
available at https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/full-transcript-third-2016-presidential-debate
-230063 [https://perma.cc/Q6JR-N6SF]).
31. Donald J. Trump, Election Night Victory Speech (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/
2016/11/09/politics/donald-trump-victory-speech/index.html
[https://perma.cc/PBK5-69NF]
(“[W]e will always put America’s interests first[.]”).
32. The Third Presidential Debate, supra note 30.
33. Id.
34. Donald J. Trump, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefings-statements/the-inaugural-address/ [https://perma.cc/F59L-GXLL].
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back his broad promise to make the Mexican government pay for the
wall, but did not back down on building the wall.
A. During the 2016 Campaign
The wall was a focal point from the inception of Donald Trump’s
campaign. When Donald Trump announced his candidacy on June 16,
2015, he first announced his plans regarding immigration:
When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re
not sending you. They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that
have lots of problems and they’re bringing those problems with us.
They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And
some, I assume, are good people. . . . I would build a great wall, and
nobody builds walls better than me, believe me, and I’ll build them very
inexpensively, I will build a great, great wall on our southern border.
And I’ll have Mexico pay for that wall.35

On Super Tuesday, Candidate Trump cited the Great Wall of China to
support the wall: “The Great Wall of China, built 2,000 years ago, is
13,000 miles, folks, and they didn’t have Caterpillar tractors, . . . [t]hey
didn’t have cranes. They didn’t have excavation equipment,” he said.36
“We can do that so beautifully.”37
Many—including the Mexican government—were quick to condemn
Trump’s broad comments and specifically the border wall as racist and
hateful rhetoric.38 Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto said that he was
“saddened” by the wall and stated that “Mexico does not believe in
walls. . . . Mexico will not pay for any wall.”39 In the United States,
Senator Jeff Merkley went as far as to call the wall a “racist symbol.” 40
35. Trump Presidential Announcement Speech, supra note 7.
36. Donald J. Trump, Super Tuesday News Conference (Mar. 2, 2016), https://time.com/
4245134/super-tuesday-donald-trump-victory-speech-transcript-full-text/ [https://perma.cc/J7EAHRUL].
37. Id.
38. Dave Graham, Mexico Blasts Trump Stance on Immigrants as Absurd, Racist, REUTERS
(Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-mexico/mexico-blaststrump-stance-on-immigrants-as-absurd-racist-idUSKCN0QO1SZ20150819
[https://perma.cc/
PRF2-2SSM].
39. Enrique Peña Nieto (@EPN), TWITTER (Jan. 25, 2017, 6:41 PM), https://twitter.com/
EPN/status/824447050066468865 [https://perma.cc/Q4NY-4CCN]; see also Mexico: We Will Not
Pay for Trump Border Wall, BBC NEWS (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-uscanada-38753826 [https://perma.cc/85VJ-62VQ] (providing English subtitles and discussing the
Twitter exchange between the presidents).
40. Merkley: Dems Support Border Security, Not 'Racist Symbol' Border Wall (MSNBC
television broadcast Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.msnbc.com/mtp-daily/watch/merkley-demssupport-border-security-not-racist-symbol-border-wall-1437745731696 [https://perma.cc/GW3G9LXX]; see also Press Release, Sen. Jeff Merkley, Merkley Responds to State of the Union Address
(Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.merkley.senate.gov/news/press-releases/merkley-responds-to-state-
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But the sentiment stuck—Trump and the Republican Party used the
wall to gain support for this campaign. For example, although a CBS
News/New York Times poll showed a drop in overall support for a border
wall from 47 percent in January 2016 to 39 percent in July 2016,41 a
Rasmussen poll in December 2016 showed that Republican support for
the wall remained unchanged in that time, with 65 percent of Republicans
believing Trump should build the wall during his first year of office.42
Thus, Republicans employed the wall as a mechanism to rally support for
not only Trump, but the entire Republican party. Senator Ted Cruz, who
had run against Trump in the Republican primaries, sought to excite the
crowd at the Republican National Convention in Cleveland by criticizing
then-President Barack Obama and drumming support for the wall:
President Obama is a man who does everything backwards. He wants
to . . . open up our borders. He exports jobs, and imports terrorists.
Enough is enough. . . . We deserve an immigration system that puts
America first, and yes, builds a wall to keep America safe.43

Later that day, in his acceptance speech, Trump said, “[w]e are going to
build a great border wall to stop illegal immigration, to stop the gangs
and the violence, and to stop the drugs from pouring into our
communities.”44 The Republican Party endorsed Trump’s plan,
amending its party platform to include support for the wall: “The border
wall must cover the entirety of the southern border and must be sufficient
to stop both vehicular and pedestrian traffic.”45
After Trump secured the Republican nomination, his advisors made it
clear that he would not need the support of Congress to build a wall. Rudy
Giuliani told CNN that “[Trump] can do it by executive order, by just
of-the-union-address [https://perma.cc/X9CT-DX9A] (“[Trump] remains singularly focused on his
unpopular, racist wall, and in using terror and trauma as a deterrence against refugees seeking
asylum.”).
41. Sarah Dutton et al., Poll: Trump and Clinton Voters on Immigration, Economy, Trade, CBS
NEWS (July 14, 2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-hillary-clinton-voters-onrace-the-economy-trade-immigration/ [https://perma.cc/MP6H-9S7R].
42. Most GOP Voters Want a Border Wall in Trump’s First Year, RASMUSSEN REPS. (Dec. 6,
2016), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/ immigration/
december_2016/most_gop_voters_want_a_border_wall_in_trump_s_first_year [https://perma.cc/
T3BE-26X2].
43. Sen. Ted Cruz, Speech at the Republican National Convention (July 21, 2016),
https://time.com/4416396/republican-convention-ted-cruz-donald-trump-endorsement-speechtranscript-video/ [https://perma.cc/G3QN-KNAQ].
44. Donald J. Trump, Acceptance of the Republican Nomination Speech (July 21, 2016),
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-transcript-donald-trump-nomination-acceptancespeech-at-rnc-225974 [https://perma.cc/BE3A-A5EB]).
45. COMM. ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR 2016 REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, REPUBLICAN
PLATFORM 2016, at 26 (2016), https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_
FINAL%5B1%5D-ben_1468872234.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4EH-8EQ6].
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reprogramming money within the [sic] immigration service, and not only
that, they have actually approved a wall for certain portions of the border
that hasn’t even been built yet. So you could take a year building that out
. . . .”46 This foreshadowed various statements during the Trump
presidency that would signal the president’s willingness to use a national
emergency and other reprogramming mechanisms in the event that
Congress failed to make funds available. In a 2018 meeting with
Democratic congressional leaders, for example, President Trump said, “if
we don’t get what we want, one way or the other—whether it’s through
[Congress], through a military, through anything you want to call—I will
shut down the government.”47
B. After the Election and Into the Shutdown
Shortly after candidate Trump became President-Elect Trump, he
scaled back his ambitions. He conceded that a wall-like physical barrier
might not be necessary.48 In various interviews after the election, Trump
indicated that fencing might be more appropriate than an actual wall in
some portions, and that, in some sections, “you don’t need a wall, because
you have, you know, you have mountains, you have other things. You
have large and rather vicious rivers.”49 He continued that Mexico would
not actually pay for the wall, and that was not what he had meant: “When
—during the campaign, I would say, ‘Mexico is going to pay for it.’
Obviously, I never said this and I never meant they’re going to write out
a check.”50 He continued, “They are [going to pay for the wall]. They are
paying for it with the incredible deal we made, called the United States,
Mexico, and Canada USMCA deal. . . . So, Mexico is paying for the wall
indirectly.”51 In time, it soon became clear that Mexico indeed would not
pay for the wall.52
46. New Day With Chris Cuomo and Alisyn Camerota (CNN television broadcast Nov. 10,
2016) (transcript available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1611/10/nday.07.html
[https://perma.cc/HCS7-TSGS]).
47. President Donald Trump, Remarks in Meeting with Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer
and House Speaker-Designate Nancy Pelosi (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-meeting-senate-minority-leader-chuck-schumerhouse-speaker-designate-nancy-pelosi/ [https://perma.cc/3XM7-RAKW].
48. Hannity: Here’s Trump’s Message to Those Who Are Upset About His Election Victory (Fox
News Channel television broadcast Dec. 01, 2016), https://insider.foxnews.com/2016/12/01/
donald-trump-hannity-his-election-victory-message-protesters [https://perma.cc/9MPU-FAUR].
49. Id.
50. President Donald Trump, Remarks Before Marine One Departure (Jan. 10, 2019),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-onedeparture-30/ [https://perma.cc/UWS8-F3SU].
51. Id.
52. Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto wrote on Twitter: “I repeat what I said personally,
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More importantly, Congress declined appropriate funding for the wall.
The president initially asked for support of “$1.6 billion for 65 miles of
new border wall construction in the the Rio Grande Valley . . . .”53 During
the negotiations leading up to the 2019 fiscal year appropriations bill, the
president declared that he would not sign a bill that did not include funds
for the border wall: “I’ve made my position very clear: Any measure that
funds the government must include border security. . . . Walls work
whether we like it or not. They work better than anything.”54
This impasse led to the longest government shutdown in history, which
began on December 22, 2019.55 The White House’s request nearly
quadrupled on January 6, 2019, when the Acting Director of the Office
of Management and Budget, Russell Vought, sent a letter to the United
States Senate Committee on Appropriations, emphasizing that “any
strategy to achieve operational control along the southern border is
physical infrastructure to provide requisite impedance and denial.”56 The
White House thus requested $5.7 billion for construction of a steel barrier
for the Southwest border,57 which “would fund construction of a total of
approximately 234 miles of new physical barrier.”58 Still, the House and
Senate did not present the president with a bill that included his requested
funding.59
C. Refocusing the Effort: Declaring a National Emergency
When the shutdown ended with a temporary funding bill on January
25, 2019,60 President Trump refocused his effort to obtain funding
through an emergency declaration. Alluding to his emergency authority,
he stated: “As everyone knows, I have a very powerful alternative, but I
Mr. Trump: Mexico would never pay for a wall.” Enrique Peña Nieto (@EPN), TWITTER (Google
trans., Sept. 1, 2016, 12:06 PM), https://twitter.com/EPN/status/771423919978913792
[https://perma.cc/9XS9-VKF6].
53. U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR 2019, at 3 (2018).
54. President Donald Trump, Remarks at Signing of H.R. 2, the Agriculture Improvement Act
of 2018 (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-presidenttrump-signing-h-r-2-agriculture-improvement-act-2018/ [https://perma.cc/5MBP-ZK4L].
55. 164 CONG. REC. H10590 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2018) (statement of Rep. McGovern) (“I think
it is embarrassing and it is wrong. 800,000 Federal employees will not get paid during this holiday
season because of the shutdown.”).
56. 165 CONG. REC. H588 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 2019) (statement of Rep. Perry).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See 164 CONG. REC. S8012 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2018) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (“I cannot
support the version of the short-term continuing resolution that the House passed last night. The
$5.7 billion in wall funding added by House Republicans is accompanied by no meaningful
justification from the White House.”).
60. See Further Additional Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 116–5, 133 Stat. 10, 10
(2019) (providing funding for several agencies, but failing to provide any money for southern wall).
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didn’t want to use it at this time.”61 President Trump furthermore made
clear that he would see the issue through, whether he had Congress’s
approval or not: “The Wall will get built one way or the other!”62 His
Chief of Staff, Mick Mulvaney, confirmed that intent, stating that the
president was going to “build the wall . . . . [W]e’ll take as much money
as you can give us and then we will go off and find the money someplace
else legally in order to secure that southern barrier. But this is going to
get built with or without Congress.”63 Mulvaney continued:
There are other funds of money that are available to [the President]
through what we call reprogramming. There is money that he can get at
and is legally allowed to spend, and I think it—needs to be said again
and again that all of this is going to be legal. There are statutes on the
books as to how any President can do this. . . . There are certain funds
of money that he can get to without declaring a national emergency and
other funds that he can only get to after declaring a national
emergency.64

All-in-all, the Chief of Staff claimed these funds would amount to well
over $5.7 billion.65 Further shedding light on the president’s intent, he
explained, “The President doesn’t really want to do it. . . . He would
prefer legislation because that’s the right way to go, and it’s the proper
way to spend money in this country.” 66 However, the bipartisan funding
bill for fiscal year 2019 authorized about $1.375 billion—far short of the
$5.7 billion the president wanted.67 On the same day the president signed
into act the Appropriations Bill, he issued a proclamation “declaring a
national emergency concerning the southern border of the United
States.”68

61. President Donald Trump, Remarks by President Trump on the Government Shutdown
(Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trumpgovernment-shutdown/ [https://perma.cc/Y3D2-TSPJ].
62. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 9, 2019, 4:02 PM), https://twitter
.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1094355899194454017?lang=en [https://perma.cc/35CJ-EA4Y].
63. Mick Mulvaney on Chances of Border Deal, Democrats Ramping Up Investigation of Trump
Admin, (Fox News Channel television broadcast Feb. 10, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=l_Z0xx_zS0M [https://perma.cc/ULT2-7UW7].
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-6, § 230(a)(1), 133 Stat. 13, 28.
That $1.375 billion was specifically designated “for the construction of primary pedestrian fencing,
including levee pedestrian fencing, in the Rio Grande Valley Sector . . . .” Id.
68. Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4949, 4949 (Feb. 15, 2019). The details of the
proclamation and accompanying fact sheet are detailed infra, notes 102–04.
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Following the declaration, Congress terminated the president’s
national emergency,69 but he vetoed the termination,70 and Congress
failed to override that veto.71 Texas Democratic Representative Joaquin
Castro introduced the override measure in the House of Representatives,
stating that:
The Constitution provides Congress with the power of the purse and
expressly prohibits the President from spending funds that Congress has
not appropriated. Here, Congress has not authorized or appropriated
funding to build a wall on the southern border. Indeed, Congress has
repeatedly chosen not to do so in response to the President’s multiple
requests for such funding since becoming President.72

Representative Castro’s resolution passed in the House with a vote of
245-182, and in the Senate with a vote of 59-41, garnering bipartisan
support in both chambers.73 The president vetoed Congress’s joint
resolution on March 15, 2019.74 In his statement accompanying the veto,
the president described his reasoning:
[O]ur porous southern border continues to be a magnet for lawless
migration and criminals and has created a border security and
humanitarian crisis that endangers every American. Last month alone,
[United States Custom and Border Protection (CBP)] apprehended
more than 76,000 aliens improperly attempting to enter the United
States along the southern border—the largest monthly total in the last 5
years. In fiscal year 2018, CBP seized more than 820,000 pounds of
drugs at our southern border, including 24,000 pounds of cocaine,
64,000 pounds of methamphetamine, 5,000 pounds of heroin, and 1,800
pounds of fentanyl. . . . The situation at the southern border is rapidly
deteriorating because of who is arriving and how they are arriving. . . .
My highest obligation as President is to protect the Nation and its
people. Every day, the crisis on our border is deepening, and with new
surges of migrants expected in the coming months, we are straining our
border enforcement personnel and resources to the breaking point. H.J.
Res. 46 ignores these realities.75

69. H.R.J. Res. 46, 116th Cong. (2019).
70. President Donald Trump, Veto Message to the House of Representatives for H.J. Res. 46
(Mar. 15, 2019) [hereinafter Veto Message], https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
veto-message-house-representatives-h-j-res-46/ [https://perma.cc/2XM7-95M9].
71. 165 CONG. REC. H2814–15 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2019).
72. 165 CONG. REC. E193 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 2019) (statement of Rep. Castro).
73. H.R.J. Res. 46, 116th Cong. (2019); 165 CONG. REC. H2217–18 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2019)
(relating, through Roll Vote no. 94, to a national emergency declared by the president on February
15, 2019); 165 CONG. REC. H2814–15 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2019); 165 CONG. REC. S1882 (daily ed.
Mar. 14, 2019).
74. Veto Message, supra note 70.
75. Id.
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The House responded with override proceedings.76 Representative
DeFazio spoke first, asking the House to “override the President’s veto
of Congress’ bipartisan action to terminate his so-called national
emergency declaration. The bottom line is that this emergency
declaration is nothing more than an end run around a majority . . . in
complete disregard of our constitutional system of separation of
powers.”77 On March 26, 2019, the House voted on whether to override
the president’s veto.78 In the end, all of the House Democrats and fourteen
Republicans made a final tally of 248 votes in favor versus 181 against,
short of the two-thirds required to override a presidential veto.79
II. STATUTORY UNDERPINNINGS
Did the president have authority to divert congressional funds to build
the wall? The president relied on three statutes for his authority to divert
congressional appropriations to build the wall, relying on the Treasury
Forfeiture Fund, funds in support of counterdrug activities, and
Department of Defense funds for military reconstruction projects to
divert congressional appropriations to build the wall.80 This section
addresses those claims, and concludes that not one of these statutes would
authorize the president to build the wall.
A. Emergency Independent Statutes
Two statutes the president relied upon do not require the declaration of
a national emergency at all. This includes a provision of the Treasury
Forfeiture Fund and a counterdrug activities construction fund. However,
those cited non-emergency-tied statutes do not provide funding for the
wall.
1. Treasury Forfeiture Funds
Congress established the Department of the Treasury Forfeiture Fund,
which is generally available to the Secretary of the Treasury “with respect
to seizures and forfeitures made pursuant to [applicable] law,” and for
certain “law enforcement purposes.”81 These specific “law enforcement
purposes” include the seizure of property, contracting services to
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

165 CONG. REC. H2806 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2019).
Id. (statement of Rep. DeFazio).
165 CONG. REC. H2814–15 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2019).
Id.
The Funds Available to Address the National Emergency at Our Border, NAT’L SEC. & DEF.
FACT SHEETS (Feb. 26, 2019) [hereinafter Funds Fact Sheet], https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefings-statements/funds-available-address-national-emergency-border [https://perma.cc/58TGZVBV].
81. 31 U.S.C. § 9705(a) (2019).
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maintain seized properties, and payment for training foreign law
enforcement.82 Notably excluded from the list is the use of funds to pay
for a broad, multi-billion-dollar construction project tenuously related to
non-Treasury law enforcement activities.
2. Counterdrug Activities
The second statutory provision on which the president relied,
10 U.S.C. § 284, authorizes “support for the counterdrug activities,”
including the “[c]onstruction of roads and fences and installation of
lighting to block drug smuggling corridors across international
boundaries of the United States” and “[t]he establishment (including an
unspecified minor military construction project) and operation of bases
of operations or training facilities for the purposes of facilitating
counterdrug activities[.]”83 Section 284 further authorizes “support for
the counterdrug activities . . . of any other department of the Federal
Government” if “such support is requested . . . by the official who has
responsibility for [such] counterdrug activities.”84 Although this section
may be used for a “fence,” in a “drug smuggling corridor” it does not
authorize a wall spanning the entirety of the southern border.85 Moreover,
an authorized “minor military construction project” must have a cost less
than $6 million, and Congress has only appropriated $881 million under
§ 284—far short of the $2.5 billion that the White House claims these
funds will provide.86
The president claimed that his authority under § 284 works in
conjunction with § 8005 of the 2019 Department of Defense
Appropriations Act.87 Under 31 U.S.C. § 1532, “[a]n amount available
under law may be withdrawn from one appropriation account and
credited to another or to a working fund only when authorized by law.”88
The president claims § 8005 provides such law.89 Section 8005 authorizes
the Secretary of Defense to augment the drug interdiction fund and
authorizes the reprogramming of up to $4 billion “of working capital
funds of the Department of Defense or funds made available in this Act

82. Id. §§ 9705(a)(1)(A)–(J).
83. 10 U.S.C. § 284 (2016).
84. Id. § 284(a), (a)(1)(A).
85. Id. § 284(b)(7).
86. Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education
Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-245, 132 Stat.
2982, 2997 (2018).
87. Funds Fact Sheet, supra note 80.
88. 31 U.S.C. § 1532 (2019).
89. Funds Fact Sheet, supra note 80.

448

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 51

to the Department of Defense.”90 However, in order to reprogram funds
under the Act, § 8005 requires that “such authority to transfer may not be
used unless for higher priority items, based on unforeseen military
requirements, than those for which originally appropriated.”91 Further,
§ 8005 provides that reprogramming will be proscribed “in [any] case
where the item for which funds are requested has been denied by the
Congress.”92
B. The National Emergencies Act
1. Statutory Framework
The NEA allows the president to declare a national emergency. 93 The
NEA passed and went into effect on September 14, 1976; it prescribes
rules for the declaration of modern national emergencies.94 It states that
“[a]ny provisions of law conferring powers and authorities to be
exercised during a national emergency shall be effective and remain in
effect . . . only when the President . . . specifically declares a national
emergency.”95 The NEA is the main statutory source for the president’s
ability to declare a domestic national emergency.
The NEA lacks substantive limits on the president’s ability to declare
a national emergency.
The initial draft of the bill provided that the president could declare a
national emergency in the event the President finds that the
proclamation of a national emergency is essential to the preservation,
protection, and defense of the Constitution, and is essential to the
common defense, safety, or well-being of the territory and people of the
United States.96

Legislators removed this text because they were concerned that a future
president would see it as a conferral of substantive authority. 97 But the
removal of this requirement was not meant to provide the president with
a blank check for declaring an emergency—the NEA does not provide an
independent legal basis that justifies declaring an emergency. To the
contrary, Congress intended “that the NEA regulate emergency powers
90. § 8005, 132 Stat. at 2999.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, § 201, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 1621 (1976)).
94. See generally id.
95. 50 U.S.C. § 1621(b) (2019).
96. Patrick A. Thronson, Toward Comprehensive Reform of America’s Emergency Law Regime,
46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 737, 749 (2013) (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-1170, at 7 (1974)).
97. Id.
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exercised pursuant to other statutes.”98 Even so, Congress ultimately did
not provide any substantive limits in the NEA.
Substantive limits within the NEA have been ruled unconstitutional.
The initial draft of the NEA had a mechanism for oversight of national
emergencies through accountability and reporting requirements.99 In the
original framework of the NEA, Congress had to vote by concurrent
resolution to extend a national emergency after six months, and could
vote to terminate one at any time.100 Concurrent resolutions were later
found unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha, which struck down a concurrent
resolution process in the context of authority over aliens.101 Congress
responded to this by implementing a joint resolution mechanism to
overturn a presidential declaration of emergency, which requires the
president’s signature to become law.102 Although Congress can override
a president’s veto of a joint resolution, the effect is that two-thirds of both
chambers is required to invalidate a president’s emergency declaration.
As a result, the limits on presidential authority to declare an emergency
that do appear in the text of the NEA are procedural. The NEA allows the
president to “declare [a] national emergency” with respect to “[statutes]
authorizing the exercise, during the period of a national emergency” and
requires that a president transmit the declaration of a national emergency
to Congress and publish it in the Federal Register.103 Moreover, the NEA
eliminated or modified some statutory grants of emergency authority,
required the President to formally the existence of a national emergency
and to specify what statutory authority activated by the declaration
would be used, and provided Congress a means to countermand the
President’s declaration and the activated authority being sought.104

Once an emergency is declared, the president must “specif[y] the
provisions of law under which he proposes that he, or other officers will
act.”105 Finally, the NEA states that “Congress shall meet to consider a
vote on a joint resolution to determine whether that emergency shall be
terminated” no more than six months after an emergency is declared.106
98. Id.
99. See National Emergencies Act § 201(b), 50 U.S.C. § 1621(b) (2019) (restricting the powers
and authorities of the Act to “(1) only when the President . . . specifically declares a national
emergency, and (2) only in accordance with this Act”).
100. See National Emergencies Act § 202, 50 U.S.C. § 1622 (2019).
101. INS v. Chadha et al., 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
102. 50 U.S.C. § 1622(a)(1).
103. Id. § 1621(a).
104. L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. REP. 98-505: NATIONAL EMERGENCY
POWERS, at Summary (2019).
105. 50 U.S.C. § 1631 (2018).
106. Id. § 1622(b).
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The result is that the president is given a lot of discretion with respect to
substance, so long as they follow these procedural requirements.
Even these procedural requirements, however, do not have the full
force the framers of the statute intended. In Beacon Products Corp. v.
Reagan, the First Circuit interpreted the procedural requirement that
“Congress shall meet” to consider a joint resolution to determine whether
the emergency will be terminated.107 Even though both parties stipulated
that Congress did not meet to consider such a resolution after President
Reagan had used a national emergency declaration to impose trading
restrictions with Nicaragua, the First Circuit found the emergency valid:
It seems far more likely that Congress meant the “shall meet to consider
a vote” language to give those who want to end the emergency the
chance to force a vote on the issue, rather than to require those who do
not want to end the emergency to force congressional action to prevent
automatic termination.108

The NEA’s lack of substantive requirements, coupled with the
softening of its procedural requirements, has led to abuse of the Act.109
2. The President’s Contentions and Section 2808
Invoking his authority under the NEA, the president proclaimed:
The current situation at the southern border presents a border security
and humanitarian crisis that threatens core national security interests
and constitutes a national emergency. The southern border is a major
entry point for criminals, gang members, and illicit narcotics. The
problem of large-scale unlawful migration through the southern border
is long-standing, and despite the executive branch’s exercise of existing
statutory authorities, the situation has worsened in certain respects in
recent years. In particular, recent years have seen sharp increases in the
number of family units entering and seeking entry to the United States
and an inability to provide detention space for many of these aliens
while their removal proceedings are pending. If not detained, such
aliens are often released into the country and are often difficult to
remove from the United States because they fail to appear for hearings,
do not comply with orders of removal, or are otherwise difficult to
locate. In response to the directive in my April 4, 2018, memorandum
and subsequent requests for support by the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the Department of Defense has provided support and
107. Beacon Products Corp. v. Reagan, 814 F.2d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 1987) (discussing what legal
remedy the NEA affords for Congressional inaction violating the “periodic meeting” clause).
108. Id. at 5.
109. See Thronson, supra note 96, at 753–54 (questioning whether emergency powers are
“consistent with our conceptions of the presidency or limited government” given how the powers
have been used to justify “extrajudicial authority to deprive” persons and organizations of personal
assets and “unilaterally suspend wage-rate requirements for public contracts”).
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resources to the Department of Homeland Security at the southern
border. Because of the gravity of the current emergency situation, it is
necessary for the Armed Forces to provide additional support to address
the crisis.110

The White House issued additional information regarding the
declaration in a fact sheet.111
The president wishes to use the NEA as a key to access § 2808, which
he claims will provide up to $3.6 billion in military reconstruction
funding to build the wall.112 Section 2808 allows the Secretary of Defense
to “undertake military construction projects, and may authorize the
Secretaries of the military departments to undertake military construction
projects, not otherwise authorized by law.”113 Section 2808 requires (1)
that the president declare a national emergency under the NEA, which
“requires the use of the armed forces,” (2) the use of funds be for “military
construction projects,” and (3) those construction projects be “necessary
to support such use of the armed forces.”114
The legal basis of the use of the non-emergency-tied statutes is
dubious. First, although 31 U.S.C. § 9705 authorizes Treasury Forfeiture
Funds “in connection with the law enforcement activities of any Federal
agency,”115 it also limits the use of those funds by listing the specific “law
enforcement purposes.”116 Expressly allowed in this list are using funds
to pay for seizure of property, contracting services to maintain seized
properties, and payment for training foreign law enforcement.117 Notably
excluded from the list is the use of funds to pay for a broad, multi-billiondollar construction project tenuously related to non-Treasury-related law
enforcement activities. Additionally, while § 284 authorizes the
construction of a “fence,” in a “drug smuggling corridor,”118 it does not
110. Press Release, President Donald Trump, Presidential Proclamation Declaring a National
Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the United States (Feb. 15, 2019) [hereinafter
National Emergency Declaration], https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidentialproclamation-declaring-national-emergency-concerning-southern-border-united-states/
[https://perma.cc/S6DZ-MDZQ].
111. For a discussion of this fact sheet in more detail, see generally supra note 13.
112. See Funds Fact Sheet, supra note 80 (stating that, after declaring a national emergency,
the president may invoke 10 U.S.C. § 2808 allowing the Secretary of Defense to direct the military
construction); see also 31 U.S.C. § 1532 (2018) (providing that “an amount authorized to be
withdrawn and credited” from one agency or department “is available for the same purpose and
subject to the same limitations provided by the law appropriating the amount”).
113. 10 U.S.C. § 2808(a) (2018).
114. Id.
115. 31 U.S.C. § 9705(g)(4)(B) (2018).
116. Id. § 9705(a).
117. Id. §§ 9705(a)(1)(B)–(J).
118. 10 U.S.C. § 284 (b)(7) (2018).
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authorize a wall spanning the entirety of the United States-Mexico
border. However, 10 U.S.C. § 2805 also states that an authorized
“unspecified minor military construction project” in support of
counterdrug activities is one that has an approved cost equal to or less
than $6,000,000.119 In toto for fiscal year 2019 Congress only
appropriated $881 million under § 284—far short of the $2.5 billion that
the White House claims these funds will provide, and of course, far short
of the $5.7 billion the president requested that Congress provide for the
wall.120
3. Tall Story for a Tall Wall? Substantive Challenges to the National
Emergency Declaration Under the NEA
After President Trump declared a national emergency, fifty-eight
former national security officials, including Madeleine Albright, filed a
Joint Declaration against the decision challenging the substantive validity
of the president’s national emergency.121 The officials cited four main
reasons for their protestation:
To our knowledge, the President’s assertion of a national emergency
here is unprecedented, in that he seeks to address a situation: (1) that
has been enduring, rather than one that has arisen suddenly; (2) that in
fact has improved over time rather than deteriorated; (3) by
reprogramming billions of dollars in funds in the face of clear
congressional intent to the contrary; and (4) with assertions that are
rebutted not just by the public record, but by his agencies’ own official
data, documents, and statements.122

According to the report, border crossings are at a historic low, rather
than a current, urgent issue.123 Moreover, the report cites to the
administration’s own reports that “there was no credible evidence
indicating that international terrorist groups have established bases in
Mexico” and a lack of terrorists crossing the United States-Mexico
border.124 Additionally, the declaration criticizes the president’s
justifications, namely the presence of violent crime at the southern border
119. 10 U.S.C. § 2805(d)(1)(A) (2018).
120. Letter from Russell T. Vought, Acting Dir., Exec. Office President, Office Mgmt &
Budget, to Richard Shelby, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. Appropriations (Jan. 6, 2019),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Final-Shelby-1-6-19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7T4F-W5JM].
121. FORMER UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, JOINT DECLARATION 1–5 (Feb. 25,
2019), (available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/read-the-letter-58-former-national-securityofficials-protest-trump-s-emergency-declaration/f5bbafbb-eabd-41d9-8cab-740fd515e8a7_note
.html?utm_term=.0938210747cb [https://perma.cc/Q4LW-DQCZ]).
122. Id. at 6.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 7.
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and the occurrence of human and drug trafficking. 125 Finally, the report
challenges the use of a national emergency to circumvent the typical
appropriations process.126
Additionally, sixteen states sued the president over the diversion of
funds.127 The complaint in California v. Trump alleged that the
president’s declaration is substantively invalid. The complaint argued
that, while President Trump has alleged a crisis since his campaign, he
did not declare a national emergency until 2019, undermining any
urgency of the emergency declaration.128 Similar to the joint declaration
of former defense officials, the complaint alleged that there is no “crisis”
or “invasion” at the southern border to support the declaration of an
emergency; that the “[a]dministration’s assertions that terrorism concerns
justify its actions are without factual basis”; that there is no evidence that
a wall will decrease crime rates; and that there is therefore no basis to
divert funds.129 Moreover, it claimed that “[t]he federal government’s
own data prove[s] there is no national emergency at the southern border
that warrants [the] construction of a wall.”130 It accused the president of
using the wall as a “vanity project” that would “cause significant harm to
the public safety, public fisc, environment, and well-being” of the people
living in those states.131 Citing the Constitution, the complaint claimed
that the declaration of a national emergency violates the separation of
powers, that the president may not spend money that Congress has not
expressly appropriated, and that any agency acting to carry out the wall
would be acting beyond the powers of their offices.132 On May 24,
2019, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California agreed.133
In El Paso City v. Trump, the plaintiffs in a Western District of Texas
also challenged the substantive validity of the president’s national
emergency declaration.134 First noting that President Trump’s declaration
125. Id. at 7–8.
126. Id. at 10–11.
127. See generally Complaint, California v. Trump, 379 F. Supp. 3d 928 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No.
19-CV-00872), 2019 WL 669456 [hereinafter California v. Trump Complaint].
128. Id. at 21–25.
129. Id. at 37–38.
130. Id. at 4; see also Complaint at 1, Sierra Club v. Trump, 379 F. Supp. 3d 883, 891 (N.D.
Cal. 2019) (No. 19-CV-00892), 2019 WL 669456 [hereinafter Sierra Club Complaint] (alleging
very similar concerns to plaintiffs in California v. Trump).
131. California v. Trump Complaint, supra note 127, at 5.
132. Id. at 49–52.
133. See California v. Trump, 379 F.Supp. 3d 928, 948 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (stating that it agrees
with the plaintiff’s contention that, the use of the funds in this way would likely violate separation
of powers principles).
134. First Amended Complaint, El Paso Cty. v. Trump, 407 F.Supp.3d 655 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 20,
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“marks the first time a President has used the NEA to contravene the
clearly expressed will of Congress on a policy and appropriations
matter,”135 those plaintiffs allege that the “NEA thus permits the
President to direct the use of certain resources, but only in a qualifying
emergency and only in the manner and to the extent that Congress has
previously authorized by statute.”136 Thus, while the NEA grants broad
authority, those plaintiffs claim that the president has “fabricate[d] an
improper or pretextual basis for [his] declaration.”137
4. Faithful Execution & the Take Care Clause
The president’s arguments are categorial yet untenable. President
Trump’s national emergency declaration under the NEA claimed that
there is a “border security and humanitarian crisis that threatens core
national security interests and constitutes a national emergency.”138 It
continued that the “border is a major entry point for criminals, gang
members, and illicit narcotics.”139 It additionally claimed unlawful
immigration at the southern border has been continuing and longstanding and characterizes migration as worsening.140
The declaration employs the use of the Armed Forces to aid in the
construction of the wall.141 In addition to the $601 million from the
Department of the Treasury Forfeiture Fund and $2.5 billion from funds
pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 284, President Trump planned to reprogram $3.6
billion from the Department of Defense military construction budget.142
The $3.6 billion are the only funds the president is attempting to use that
require the declaration of a national emergency.
The declaration of a national emergency grants the president 136 new
statutory powers.143 However, despite these new statutory powers and the
NEA’s lack of statutory substantive and procedural requirements, the
NEA cannot be used where Congress has expressly declined to fund the
project at issue. Given the lack of clear statutory guidance, there must be
a standard under which to judge the president’s decision. This section will
2019) (No. 19-CV-00066), 2019 WL 6689002.
135. Id. at 24.
136. Id. at 11.
137. Id.
138. National Emergency Declaration, supra note 110.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Border Security Fact Sheet, supra note 13.
143. BRENNAN CTR. JUSTICE, A GUIDE TO EMERGENCY POWERS AND THEIR USE (Dec. 5,
2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/emergency-powers
[https://perma.cc/5DC64PCT].
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develop an approach and standard under which a declaration of a national
emergency may be judged.
a. The Need for a Standard
The NEA does not impose any substantive limits on the declaration of
a national emergency.144 However, that does not mean that decisions
made under it should be unreviewable.
First, in an influential article, Emergency Power and the Decline of
Liberalism, Jules Lobel argued that the main underlying issue
surrounding modern national emergencies is that executives have strayed
too far from a liberalist theory of emergencies.145 Under that theory,
emergency action is viewed as aberrational—where only the gravest
emergencies warrant drastic action—and as “extra-legal”—that is,
inherently unconstitutional (because the Constitution does not expressly
provide for it).146 Additionally, liberalists would require the executive to
act outside of the scope of her powers in hopes that Congress later
indemnifies him,147 essentially raising the stakes of declaring an
emergency.148 In the wake of World War II, Vietnam, and the Korean
War, the “line separating executive emergency power and normal
constitutional government [became] blurred . . . primarily because of an
aggressive United States assertion of power in the international arena.”149
Lobel argues that the answer to emergency powers does not lie in creating
a standard by which to judge the executive’s actions but requires a return
to this liberalist train of thought.150
However, such a return would first require a redefinition of American
national security, wherein executives “reject a foreign policy based upon
an ever present worldwide communist threat.”151 A return to liberalism
144. See Beacon Products Corp. v. Reagan, 814 F.2d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that the
NEA does not require Congress to meet in order to avoid automatic termination of a declared
national emergency, but rather allows those who wish to end the emergency to “force a vote” on
the matter); see also Thronson, supra note 96 at 752–53 (discussing how the First Circuit
interpreted “Congress shall meet” requirement of 50 U.S.C § 1622(b)).
145. See generally Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J.
1386 (1989).
146. Arthur S. Miller, Constitutional Law: Crisis Government Becomes the Norm, 39 OHIO ST.
L.J. 736, 738 (1989) (stating “[t]he Constitution is predicated on the assumption that crisis is
aberrational”).
147. See Lobel, supra note 145, at 1390 (stating that this system has “allowed the executive to
act without creating inherent emergency power under the Constitution”)
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1424.
150. See id. at 1389–90 (explaining how liberalism creates a legally significant dividing line
between societal and political positions and how liberalism seeks to separate emergency rule from
constitutional order by preserving the Constitution while still providing the executive power).
151. Lobel, supra note 145, at 1430.
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seems unlikely after the War on Terror—something that Jules Lobel
could not have foreseen at the time of his article. Moreover, Lobel was
focused specifically on the issues surrounding international crises that
invoked emergency powers with their primary effects abroad, such as
trade restrictions and the like. Trump’s national emergency will have its
broadest impact in the United States, and part of the answer may lie in
defining what national emergencies the president can and cannot declare.
This would reduce use of emergencies just for the sake of grabbing
additional power at will.
Likewise, the sheer amount of power that comes with the declaration
of a national emergency may warrant a standard to determine whether the
emergency is valid. Upon the declaration of a national emergency, the
president gains access to 136 new authorities, 96 of which require
“nothing more than her signature on the emergency declaration.”152 For
example, the Communications Act of 1934 allows a president to “modify,
change, suspend, or annul . . . any facility or station for wire
communication” upon a national emergency declaration.153 Perhaps
more shocking, another statute allows the president to suspend its
proscription of tests and experiments of chemical and biological agents
on civilians “during the period of any national emergency declared . . . by
the President.”154 Given the sheer amount of power an emergency
declaration grants a president, a standard for judging the legitimacy of
any emergency declaration would serve as a prudent check upon the
executive.
b. Developing a Standard
Article II of the Constitution specifies that it is the president’s duty to
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”155 While the Supreme
Court has not fully delved into what this clause permits or requires, it has
noted:
[W]e recognize that an agency’s refusal to institute proceedings shares
to some extent the characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in the
Executive Branch not to indict—a decision which has long been
regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as

152. Elizabeth Goitein, Trump’s Hidden Powers, BRENNAN CTR. JUSTICE (Dec. 5, 2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/trump-hidden-powers [https://perma.cc/S8VE-D5KY].
153. 47 U.S.C. § 606(a) (2018).
154. 50 U.S.C § 1515 (2018) (stating a president may suspend any portion or chapter of Title 50
during a period of war declared by Congress, including § 1520a(a)(1), which prohibits the Secretary
of Defense from conducting any tests or experiments involving the use of chemical or biological
agents on a civilian population).
155. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to ‘take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.156

In terms of the statutory provisions, President Trump’s national
emergency simply does not “take care” to see that the NEA’s provisions
are “faithfully executed.” A fundamental canon of statutory construction
holds that, unless otherwise defined, words must be interpreted as taking
their ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning. 157 The meaning of
the term “national emergency,” evidenced through Merriam-Webster’s
dictionary, is “a state of emergency resulting from a danger or threat of
danger to a nation from foreign or domestic sources and usually declared
to be in existence by governmental authority.”158 Moreover, prior to the
NEA, the Tenth Circuit held that “[a] national emergency must be based
on conditions beyond the ordinary. Otherwise it has no meaning. The
power of the Soviet Union in world affairs does not justify placing the
United States in a constant state of national emergency.” 159 In Congress,
an early version of the NEA provided:
In the event the President finds that a proclamation of a national
emergency is essential to preservation, protection, and defense of the
Constitution or to the common defense, safety, or well-being of the
territory or people of the United States, the President is authorized to
proclaim the existence of a national emergency.160

Elsewhere in the United States Code, “emergency” is defined as:
[A]ny occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the
President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local
efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public
health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any
part of the United States.161

Finally, during the debates surrounding the NEA, Senator Matthias
explained: “[t]o understand the full significance of the National
Emergencies Act, one must place it within the context of Congressional
efforts to reclaim prerogatives abandoned to the Executive.”162
In 1976, in a study written at the request of Senators Frank Church and
Charles Mathias, who were on the Special Committee on National
Emergencies in the Senate, Dr. Harold C. Relyea, an analyst in American
National Government at the Library of Congress, wrote that
156. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
157. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
158. National
Emergency,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/national%20emergency [https://perma.cc/74YS-LEDY].
159. United States v. Bishop, 555 F.2d 771, 777 (10th Cir. 1977).
160. H.R. 3844, 94th Cong. § 201(a) (1976).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 5122 (2018).
162. 121 CONG. REC. S2302 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1975) (statement of Sen. Charles Mathias).
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“[e]mergency powers must be carefully managed if for no other reason
than their authoritarian nature and breadth of scope.”163 He continued,
“the necessity of the Executive meeting a crisis or national exigency in
the absence of a declaration of war could prompt the utilization of
emergency powers, and this authority extends into almost every aspect of
public business.”164 According to Dr. Relyea, these concerns necessitated
procedures for the declaration of an emergency as well as “equitable
controls upon their use,” which he saw as “fundamental to the
continuance of a democratic order.”165
Echoing these concerns, Congress enacted the NEA in 1976 after a
Senate committee found that the United States had been operating under
four presidentially declared states of emergency for over forty years.166
Such a state made it “distressingly clear . . . that our Constitutional
government has been weakened by 41 consecutive years of emergency
rule.”167 Thus, the NEA was Congress’s attempt to “comprehensively
regulate and limit future declarations of national emergency.” 168
This goal of preventing this proliferation of national emergencies has,
in large part, failed. As of 2019, “the United States has been in a
continuous state of emergency for four full decades—since 1979.”169
Almost all these declarations have involved international relations. 170
One of the few relating to domestic policy involved Hurricane Katrina,
in which President Bush suspended the Davis-Bacon minimum wage
provisions in the wake of a national emergency in New Orleans.171 The
effect of his proclamation was to authorize payment lower than wages
payed to workers employed on federally funded construction projects in

163. Harold C. Relyea, Declaring and Terminating a State of National Emergency, 6 PRES.
STUDS. Q. 36, 41 (1976).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1170, at 1 (1974) (discussing how the United States has been in a
state of emergency for the past four decades dating back to President Roosevelt declaring an
emergency in 1933 for the Great Depression).
167. Id.
168. See Thronson, supra note 96, at 73738, 743–46 (giving a thorough account of the
legislative record and intent leading to the passage of the NEA).
169. Rudalevige, supra note 16.
170. BRENNAN CTR. JUSTICE, DECLARED NATIONAL EMERGENCIES UNDER THE NATIONAL
EMERGENCIES ACT (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/201910/Declared%20Emergencies%20under%20NEA101719.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9R7-YJ5M].
171. See Proclamation 7924—To Suspend Subchapter IV of Chapter 31 of Title 40, United
States Code, Within a Limited Geographic Area in Response to the National Emergency Caused
by Hurricane Katrina, 70 Fed. Reg. 54,227 (Sept. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Proclamation 7924]
(suspending Section 3142(b) of Title 40 which provides federal minimum wages that are
determined by the Secretary of Labor).
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the area devastated by Hurricane Katrina.172 Although few would argue
that Hurricane Katrina did not constitute a national emergency, paying
relief workers less than other federal workers was controversial.173 The
president laid out the following justifications:
(a) Hurricane Katrina has resulted in unprecedented property damages.
(b) The wage rates imposed by section 3142 of title 40, United States
Code, increase the cost to the Federal Government of providing Federal
assistance to these areas. (c) Suspension of the subchapter IV of chapter
31 of title 40, United States Code . . . , and the operation of related acts
to the extent they depend upon the Secretary of Labor’s determinations
under section 3142 of title 40, United States Code, will result in greater
assistance to these devastated communities and will permit the
employment of thousands of additional individuals.174

President Bush rescinded the emergency less than one month later.175
Another domestic policy declaration involved President Obama’s
declaration of a national emergency in the wake of the H1N1 influenza
epidemic in the United States.176 The president sought to “proactively
address the ongoing pandemic,” by “allow[ing] healthcare systems to
quickly implement disaster plans should they become overwhelmed.”177
Specifically, the declaration allowed healthcare facilities to “petition for
HHS approval of waivers in response to particular needs within the
geographic and temporal limits of the emergency declarations.”178
The question then becomes whether President Trump’s national
emergency falls within or outside of this precedent for domestic national
emergencies. In both above mentioned cases, the underlying emergencies
carried a sense of urgency. First, the effects of Hurricane Katrina
necessitated the use of federal aid after the hurricane swept across much
of the southeastern United States. Second, the H1N1 pandemic caused
widespread panic and killed more than one thousand Americans and
172. See id. (stating that lowering minimum wage will provide result in greater assistance to the
devastated areas).
173. See A Shameful Proclamation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2006, at A16 (criticizing the
suspension of federal minimum wage because it harms those who already are poor, and stating this
proclamation subjects individuals to subpar wages).
174. Proclamation 7924, supra note 171, at 54,227.
175. See generally Proclamation 7959—Revoking Proclamation 7924, 70 Fed. Reg. 67,899
(Nov. 3, 2005).
176. See Proclamation 8443—Declaration of a National Emergency With Respect to the 2009
H1N1 Influenza Pandemic, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,439 (Oct. 23, 2009) (detailing the public health
emergency and declaring the rapid increase in illness due to the H1N1 virus a national emergency).
177. President Obama Signs Emergency Declaration for H1N1 Flu, WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 25,
2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/10/25/president-obama-signs-emergency
-declaration-h1n1-flu [https://perma.cc/T2F9-7QSX].
178. Id.
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hospitalized over twenty thousand.179 The use of powers associated with
President Bush’s declaration was controversial and political pressures led
to the rescission of the emergency action; the H1N1 emergency expired
when the pandemic ended.
President Trump’s declaration lacks these urgencies. Political
pressures and campaign promises, not a sudden change of circumstances
like a hurricane or flu pandemic, actually led to the declaration of a
national emergency. Additionally, the nature of the emergency at the
southern border—the influx of drugs—could potentially be dire, but
building a wall could take at least ten years, even with thousands of
workers.180 Thus, the wall is fundamentally different in scope and
duration from the other two declarations, which allowed lowering the
price of contracts allowed the federal government to employ more
workers to get reconstruction work done faster; allowing medical
facilities to seek HHS waivers and provide more medical care. Here, the
wall is a massive, long term project meant to solve a long term, nonemergency issue, which does not require those sorts of measures,
particularly in light of President Trump consistently saying he didn’t need
to declare a national emergency.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Youngstown and Congressional Disapproval
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer guides the constitutional
analysis of President Trump’s emergency declaration.181 There, the
Supreme Court famously held that President Truman did not have the
authority to issue a national emergency to seize and operate the nation’s
steel mills in order to avert to expected effects of a strike by the United
Steelworkers of America.182 In an oft-cited concurring opinion on the
relation between executive and congressional power, Justice Jackson
wrote:
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization
of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these

179. Jackie Calmes & Donald G. McNeil, Jr., H1N1 Widespread in 46 States as Vaccines Lag,
N.Y TIMES (Oct. 24, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/25/us/politics/25flu.html
[https://perma.cc/U3VB-AJQM].
180. Todd C. Frankel, Build the Wall? It Could Take at Least 10 Years, Even with 10,000
Workers, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/buildthe-wall-it-could-take-at-least-10-years-even-with-10000-workers/2019/01/09/62d5eaae-137611e9-803c-4ef28312c8b9_story.html?utm_term=.d11f940a5f37 [https://perma.cc/SCH5-KRS7].
181. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
182. Id. at 588.
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circumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for what it may be
worth) to personify the federal sovereignty. . . .
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers,
but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have
concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. . . .
When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can
rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive
presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from
acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so
conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is
at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.183

President Trump’s declaration of a national emergency appears to be a
straightforward application of scenario three of Justice Jackson’s
Youngstown concurrence.
Congress has expressly declined to provide funding for the wall on two
occasions. Congress has expressly disapproved the president’s utilization
of the NEA to build the wall. Bipartisan majorities in both the House and
the Senate voted to disapprove the use of congressional appropriations to
build the wall.184 In March 2017, White House Office of Management
and Budget Director Mick Mulvaney announced that the president was
seeking $4.1 billion to build the wall.185 In May 2017, the White House
scaled back this request and asked for $1.6 billion in a budget submitted
to Congress.186 In the 2018 Consolidated Appropriations Bill, H.R. 1625,
Congress approved $1.6 billion for “14 miles of secondary fencing . . .
along the southwest border in the San Diego Sector,” “25 miles of
primary pedestrian levee fencing along the southwest border in the Rio
Grande Valley Sector,” “primary pedestrian fencing along the southwest
border in the Rio Grande Valley Sector,” and “the replacement of
existing primary pedestrian fencing along the southwest border.”187
183. Id. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
184. 165 CONG. REC. H2814, H2217–18 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2019); 165 CONG. REC. S1882
(daily ed. Mar. 14, 2019).
185. H.R. 3219—Make America Secure Appropriations Act, 2018, WHITE HOUSE (Jul. 24,
2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/h-r-3219-make-america-secureappropriations-act-2018/ [https://perma.cc/LY4N-SBQ2]; see also Off-Camera Briefing of the
FY18 Budget by Office of Management and Budget Director Mick Mulvaney, WHITE HOUSE (May
2, 2017) [hereinafter Mulvaney Briefing FY18 Budget], https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/off-camera-briefing-fy18-budget-office-management-budget-director-mick-mulvaney052217/ [https://perma.cc/SK2U-BA7Q].
186. Mulvaney Briefing FY18 Budget, supra note 185.
187. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 230, 132 Stat. 348, 616–
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Additionally, Congress approved of “$38,000,000 for border barrier
planning and design.”188 Thus, the Republican-controlled Congress
declined to fund outright the wall.
The president persisted but did not get the money from Congress. On
January 6, 2019, the president wrote a letter to Congress asking it
appropriate $5.7 billion for “construction of a steel barrier for the
Southwest border.”189 While Congress considered his funding request in
the End the Shutdown and Secure the Border Act, a Senate Amendment
to H.R. 268, the Senate eventually rejected the request on a 50-47 vote—
leading to the longest government shutdown in United States history,
spanning thirty-one days from December 22, 2018 until January 25,
2019.190 In late December 2018, House Democrats introduced legislation
that would fund many important agencies through September 30, 2019
and a Continuing Resolution to fund the Department of Homeland
Security through February 8, 2019.191 Eventually, on January 25, 2019,
the Senate passed H.J. Resolution 28, a Continuing Resolution that
funded all federal agencies through February 8, 2019, without a penny
for the wall.192 Between the end of December and January 25, members
of Congress introduced various bills that proposed to provide
appropriations for the wall, including a bill that would give the president
$25 billion, and a bill that would create a separate account in the Treasury
to hold deposits to be used to secure the southern border.193 No House or
Senate Committee held hearings on these proposals. The government
reopened on January 25, 2019 when the president signed a bill that funded
the government for three weeks.194 Thus, the president’s use of
congressionally appropriated funds to build the wall is in conflict with
Congress’s will.
When the president made his February 15, 2019 emergency
declaration, he also relied on the authority vested in his office by the
Constitution. Under Youngstown, he cannot proceed except in reliance on
his independent powers. No such independent power exists. This section
17 (2018); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-614, SOUTHWEST BOARDER SECURITY:
CBP IS EVALUATING DESIGNS AND LOCATIONS FOR BORDER BARRIERS BUT IS PROCEEDING
WITHOUT
KEY
INFORMATION
(2018),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/693488.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H6QM-7JWX].
188. Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 230(a)(5).
189. 165 CONG. REC. H587, H588 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 2019).
190. 165 CONG. REC. S327–482 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2019).
191. 164 CONG. REC. S8012 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2018).
192. Further Additional Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-5, 133 Stat. 10,
11–12 (2019).
193. 164 CONG. REC. S7319 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 2018) (statement of Sen. Inhofe for himself, Sen.
Rounds, Sen. Kennedy, and Sen. Cruz).
194. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-6, 133 Stat. 10, 13 (2019).
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will detangle the arguments associated with these powers, beginning first
with the notion of an inherent presidential power. Next, the section will
show neither his foreign affairs power to recognize nations nor
Commander-in-Chief authority to repel sudden attacks authorize the
president to spend funds appropriated by Congress for other purposes to
build the wall on the United States-Mexico border. Ultimately, the
president has unconstitutionally usurped Congress’s spending power to
fulfill his campaign promise to build the wall.
B. Inherent “Emergency Power”: Traditional Notions & Modern
Understandings
The Constitution does not provide for any general “emergency
power”—but that does not mean that the framers did not contemplate
emergencies.195 Thomas Jefferson, for example, believed that
emergencies were necessarily contrary to the law—that is, using the law
to circumvent the law—and that reading an emergency power into the
executive would be unwise because that would lead to unjustified
emergencies acting as an underpinning for “vast assertions” of power.196
He believed that the Constitution was designed to carefully limit
executive emergency power and thus acknowledged that some
emergency actions were unlawful.197 Alexander Hamilton, on the other
hand, believed that the constitutional power to defend the nation
[O]ught to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee
or define the extent and variety of national emergencies, or the
correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary
to satisfy them. The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations
are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be
imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed. This power
ought to be coextensive with all the possible combinations of such
circumstances; and ought to be under the direction of the same councils
which are appointed to preside over the common defense.198

In that essay, Hamilton was discussing joint congressional and
congressional authority; however, some presidents have used these
arguments to justify power under a unilaterally declared emergency.199
President Franklin Roosevelt, in demanding that Congress repeal the
Price Control Act, told Congress: “In the event the Congress should fail
195. 3 AMOS J. PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 907 (3d ed. 1970) (contrasting various
constitutions from several Asian, Latin American, and European countries).
196. Lobel, supra note 145, at 1396–97 (describing how this principle is understood as the
“Jeffersonian” position regarding national emergencies).
197. Id. at 1392.
198. THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 147 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961).
199. Lobel, supra note 145, at 1388.
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to act, and act adequately, I shall accept the responsibility, and I will
act . . . .” Roosevelt later noted that “[t]he President has the power . . . to
take measures necessary to avert a disaster which would interfere with
winning of the war.”200 President Nixon believed the difference between
constitutional and unconstitutional conduct with respect to national
security was the president’s judgment: “When the President does it, that
means that it is not illegal.”201 President Trump also echoed these
arguments in his speech declaring a national emergency at the southern
border after failing to secure congressional funding: “So we are going to
confront the national security crisis on our southern border. And we’re
going to do it one way or the other.”202 He continued, “I didn’t need to
do this, but I’d rather do it much faster.”203
The proliferating use of emergency powers led Clinton Rossiter to
publish Constitutional Dictatorship, which examined the experiences of
crisis governments ranging from the ancient constitutional state of Rome
to the United States.204 He uses the term “constitutional dictatorship” as
a “convenient hyperbole” underscoring how many and how extensive
emergency powers have been utilized by American presidents.205
Therein, he discussed the need for Congress to pass legislation that would
allow the executive to respond to emergency situations.206 Rossiter
recognized that “[t]he use of constitutional emergency powers may well
become the rule and not the exception.”207 As such, the future of the
nation may very well “rest in the capacity of the Presidency as an
institution of constitutional dictatorship.”208 Rossiter believed that a
“criterion of cardinal importance” was that Congress adopt a stringent
procedure for the invocation of executive power during emergencies,
which would dictate that emergency powers be narrowly drawn and
subject to tight control:

200. BILL PRESS, TRAIN WRECK: THE END OF THE CONSERVATIVE REVOLUTION 109 (2008).
201. James M. Naughton, Nixon Says a President Can Order Illegal Actions Against Dissidents,
N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 1977), https://www.nytimes.com/1977/05/19/archives/nixon-says-apresident-can-order-illegal-actions-against-dissidents.html [https://perma.cc/G96E-TUMJ].
202. Aaron Blake, Trump’s National Emergency Press Conference, Annotated, WASH. POST
(Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/02/15/trumps-bewilderingnational-emergency-press-conference-annotated/?utm_term=.7e7cc66860fc
[https://perma.cc/Z2LK-6FVG].
203. Id.
204. See generally CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS
GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES 209 (1948).
205. Id. at 292.
206. Id. at 297.
207. Id. at 297.
208. Id. at 309.
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All uses of emergency powers and all readjustments in the organization
of the government should be effected in pursuit of constitutional or legal
requirements. In short, constitutional dictatorship should be legitimate.
It is an axiom of constitutional government that no official action should
ever be taken without a certain minimum of constitutional or legal
sanction. This is a principle no less valid in time of crisis than under
normal conditions.209

But Rossiter’s concerns went unanswered until the passage of the
NEA. The second half of the twentieth century brought the largest
increase of emergency powers ever seen in the United States. President
Truman started the trend on December 16, 1950, when he declared a
national emergency in response to the Korean conflict.210 This
declaration remained in effect for almost twenty-five years and gave
subsequent presidents authority to
[S]eize property and commodities, organize and control the means of
production, call to active duty 2.5 million reservists, assign military
forces abroad, seize and control all means of transportation and
communication, restrict travel, and institute martial law, and, in many
other ways, manage every aspect of the lives of all American
citizens.211

The passage of the NEA may not eliminate naked claims of inherent
emergency power. But the law removed the argument that Congress has
conceded that point of view undercuts any argument today that the
president has an inherent emergency power under the Constitution.
C. Commander-in-Chief & Foreign Affairs
A persistent but doubtful claim that the president is “the sole organ of
foreign affairs” has been used to justify broad emergency power. In 1800,
then-Representative John Marshall explained: “The President is the sole
organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative
with foreign nations.”212 Justice Sutherland cited Marshall in United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp to justify claims of broad claims of
emergency power.213

209. Id.
210. Proclamation No. 2914—Proclaiming the Existence of a National Emergency, 15 Fed.
Reg. 9029 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1950).
211. U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, THE NATIONAL EMERGENCIES ACT (PUBLIC LAW 94-412)
20 (1976) (citing S. REP. NO. 93-1170 (1974)).
212. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (citing 10 ANNALS
OF CONG. 613 (1800)).
213. Id. at 316–19.
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But the few cases on the foreign affairs powers of the president don't
lend the claim of sole authority much support.214 Curtiss-Wright involved
the presidential exercise of authority pursuant to congressional statute.
Youngstown struck down the presidential seizure of the steel mills during
the Korean War.215 The Supreme Court decision in Dames & Moore v.
Regan,216 which approved President Carter's seizure of Iranian assets
during the Tehran American Embassy hostage crises, as well as his
suspension of Iranian claims in United States courts, turned on the
Court’s conclusion that Congress had authorized and acquiesced in these
specific action, not on the approval of a “sole authority” theory. 217
Nor is the Commander in Chief power, which all agree permits the
president to “repel sudden attacks,” a province of sole emergency
authority. Although it is true that the presidents of both parties have used
military troops without advance authorization, they have also sought and
received from Congress authorization to use military troops in combat.218
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, a divided Supreme Court declared that the
president could not establish military commissions to try enemy
combatants without express Congressional authority.219 And in
Boumediene v. Bush,220 the Supreme Court struck down the
congressional suspension of habeas corpus with respect to enemy
combatants.221
Under the War Powers Act, § 2(c) states the policy that the powers of
the president as commander in chief to introduce United States armed
forces into situations of hostilities or imminent hostilities “are exercised
only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory
authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the
United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”222 The
resolution required presidential consultation with Congress in advance

214. Linda S. Greene, Comment: After the Imperial Presidency, 47 MD. L. REV 99, 103–04
(1987).
215. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 603 (1952).
216. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 659–65 (1981).
217. Id. at 673, 680–81.
218. See generally, Jennifer K. Elsea & Matthew C. Weed, Cong. Research Serv., RL31133,
Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and
Legal Implications (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31133.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7VTDS5M].
219. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 559 (2006).
220. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 730 (2008).
221. Id.
222. 50 U.S.C § 1541(c) (2018).
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“in every possible instance” and as long as troops are involved in
hostilities.223
The record shows that both democratic and republican presidents have
used military force with and without congressional authorization. But
presidents of both parties have provided the required reports to Congress
in 168 times between 1973 and 2019, and that Congress has also ordered
the termination of the use of military force.224 The record is not a perfect
one and presidents have not always reported and important areas of
disagreement on obligation and definition remain.225 But the clear picture
is one of joint responsibility for war and congressional oversight over the
commander in chief consistent with Congress’s war related enumerated
powers.
The words of the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Milligan still ring true.
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people,
equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection
all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. . . . [I]t
could be well said that a country, preserved at the sacrifice of all the
cardinal principles of liberty, is not worth the cost of preservation.226

D. Appropriations Clause & the Separation of Powers
The separation of powers doctrine provides the most disapproving
glance at the notion of presidential inherent authority justifying the
national emergency declaration. The Constitution’s system of the
separation of powers and checks and balances is designed to prevent any
one branch from gaining too much power. The federal separation of
powers is inferred from the vesting clauses in Articles I, II, and III of the
Constitution. It is through the separation of powers lens that we should
be viewing the spending power and the Appropriations Clause.
The Constitution expressly vests the spending power in the legislature.
The Appropriations Clause is the cornerstone of Congress’s power to
spend, providing that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but
in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”227 Early on in the
nation’s history, James Madison enumerated this understanding in
Federalist No. 58:
223. 50 U.S.C § 1542 (2018).
224. MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., R42699, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION:
CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 68–94 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42699.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZQY9-S6C2] (reporting when presidents have acted under the War Powers
Resolution).
225. Id. at 95.
226. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 120–26 (1866) (highlighting the responsibility for both war
and congressional oversight).
227. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
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The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone can
propose, the supplies requisite for the support of government. They in
a word hold the purse; that powerful instrument by which we behold in
the history of the British constitution, an infant and humble
representation of the people, gradually enlarging the sphere of its
activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as it seems to have
wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the
government. This power over the purse, may in fact be regarded as the
most compleat and effectual weapon with which any constitution can
arm the immediate representatives of the people . . . .228

The Court’s interpretation of the spending power has underscored this
understanding. In Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, the Court found
that the Appropriations Clause was “intended as a restriction upon the
disbursing authority of the Executive department.”229 It continued, the
Appropriations Clause is an explicit command that “no money can be
paid out of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an act of
Congress.”230 In United States v. MacCollom, the Court again explained
that “the expenditure of public funds is proper only when authorized by
Congress, not that public funds may be expended unless prohibited by
Congress.”231 The Constitution solely vests the spending power in
Congress. The president’s attempts to gather funding for the wall by
declaring a national emergency violates the Constitution and are a serious
attempt to usurp the powers of another branch of the national government.
IV. WHAT NOW MY LOVE: RESOLUTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OR
POLITICAL PROCESS?
What now, my love, now that you’ve left me? How can I live through
another day? Watching my dreams turn into ashes, and all my hopes
into bits of clay? Once I could see, once I could feel. Now I am none,
I’ve become unreal.
—Shirley Bassey232

Despite the several lawsuits pending during the writing of this paper,
one question still remains: Is this a controversy that will be resolved in
the courts or in the political process? One lawsuit has been dismissed on
justiciability grounds. In United States House of Representatives v.
228. THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, at 296–97 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
229. Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937) (holding the
Appropriations Clause was “intended as a restriction”).
230. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 466 U.S. 414, 424 (1990) (quoting Cincinnati Soap,
301 U.S. at 321) (interpreting the commands of the Appropriations Clause).
231. United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976) (citing Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S.
272, 291 (1851)) (explaining that spending is only proper if congress has authorized it).
232. SHIRLEY BASSEY, WHAT NOW MY LOVE (Columbia Records 1962).
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Mnuchin, the District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that
Democrats in the House of Representatives did not have standing to
enjoin the Secretaries of Departments of the Treasury, Defense,
Homeland Security, and the Interior from spending funds to build a
wall.233 The court found that there was no concrete and particularized
injury required for Article III standing. The court reasoned that historical
practice and precedent signals that the House of Representatives may not
challenge injury to official authority and the availability of institutional
remedies in the statute providing for two-thirds override of the president’s
veto of a National Emergency Declaration.234
Two additional doctrines are significant in this realization: the political
question doctrine and ripeness. This section aims to dissect these
doctrines with respect to national emergency declarations, ultimately
concluding that the question is not a political question and is ripe for
judicial resolution.
Under the political question doctrine, a controversy is a nonjusticiable
political question when there is a “textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it . . . .”235 The doctrine is prudential, and generally a matter of
constitutional interpretation that attempts to determine whether the
controversy falls within the judiciary’s purview.236 This means that the
“textually demonstrable commitment” element and the “lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards” element are not entirely distinct.
In the context of national emergencies, some courts have ruled the
declaration of an emergency a nonjusticiable political question when the
emergency dealt with foreign relations.237 In Beacon Products Corp. v.
233. U.S. House of Reps. v. Mnuchin, 379 F. Supp. 3d 8, 10 (D.D.C. 2019) (holding that
spending was improper).
234. Id. at 15–23 (citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 826 (1997)).
235. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (stating the rules and test regarding when there is
a nonjusticiable political question).
236. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229–38 (1993); see also Baker, 369 U.S.
at 211 (“[W]hether the action of [either the Legislative or Executive Branch] exceeds whatever
authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a
responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.”).
237. See Chang v. United States, 859 F.2d 893, 896 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[T]o the extent that
the plaintiffs’ inquiry into the ‘true facts’ of the Libyan crisis would seek to examine the President’s
motives and justifications for declaring a national emergency, such an inquiry would likely present
a nonjusticiable political question.”); see also Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984) (quoting
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952)) (“Matters relating ‘to the conduct of foreign
relations . . . are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely
immune from judicial inquiry or interference.”); Beacon Products Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp.
1191, 1194–95 (D. Mass 1986), aff’d, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987) (emphasizing that the concerns
underlying the political question doctrine are “particularly acute whenever a court is called upon to
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Reagan, for example, the District of Massachusetts found that President
Reagan’s declaration of a national emergency prohibiting imports into
the United States from Nicaragua and exports to Nicaragua from the
United States was a nonjusticiable political question.238 There, the
Reagan Administration found that “the policies and actions of the
Government of Nicaragua constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat
to the national security and foreign policy of the United States,”239 and
declared a national emergency under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act.240 The court began its analysis by emphasizing
that the justifications underlying the prudential political question doctrine
are “particularly acute whenever a court is called upon to review the
conduct of American foreign policy.”241 Then, the court noted that
addressing whether or not Nicaragua actually posed an unusual and
extraordinary threat “would be an imprudent exercise of judicial review,”
which would “require the court to assess the wisdom of the President’s
judgment concerning the nature and extent of that threat, a matter not
susceptible to judicially manageable standards.”242 Because the court
does not have the resources to determine whether Nicaragua poses more
than an ordinary or usual threat, a decision would boil down to “policy
judgments about national security and foreign policy, judgments best left
to the political branches of the federal government.”243
Although matters dealing with foreign governments are commonly
considered political questions, there is no reason that a national
emergency affecting primarily domestic relations would face the same
fate. Recently, in Rucho v. Common Cause, the Supreme Court found the
domestic issue of political redistricting was non-reviewable as a political
question.244 There, however, the Supreme Court emphasized that it would
be impossible for the judiciary to determine “fairness” in the context of
redistricting:
“Fairness” does not seem to us a judicially manageable standard. . . .
Some criterion more solid and more demonstrably met than that seems
review the conduct of American foreign policy,” the court found that “whether Nicaragua poses a
sufficient threat to trigger the President’s IEEPA powers is a nonjusticiable political question”).
238. Beacon Products, 633 F. Supp. at 1199 (holding President Reagan’s declaration was a
nonjusticiable political question).
239. Proclamation No. 12513, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,629 (1985).
240. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2018).
241. Beacon Products, 633 F. Supp at 1194 (finding separation of powers issues particularly
acute when foreign policy is involved).
242. Id. at 1194–95.
243. Id. at 1195.
244. Rucho v. Common Clause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019) (“[P]artisan gerrymandering
claims present political questions beyond the reach of federal courts.”).
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to us necessary to enable the state legislatures to discern the limits of
their districting discretion, to meaningfully constrain the discretion of
the courts, and to win public acceptance for the courts’ intrusion into a
process that is the very foundation of democratic decisionmaking.245

In contrast, there are judicially manageable standards to determine what
constitutes an “emergency.”
Second, the doctrine of ripeness may present a barrier to judicial
resolution. Under the doctrine, federal courts require that a dispute be
sufficiently mature to warrant a decision. Under the doctrine, courts will
address to main factors: (1) the fitness of the issues for judicial
resolution—that is, whether they are factual or legal; and (2) the hardship
to the parties of withholding court consideration.246
While the first element of the ripeness inquiry would likely be met, the
facts relevant to actual hardship are more nuanced. The parties including
the states who have sued the president because they lost the diverted
funding suffered immediately from the diversion of funding from other
sources. For example, California has alleged injury “due to the loss of
federal drug interdiction, counter-narcotic, and law-enforcement funding
to the State caused by Defendants’ diversion of funding.” 247 Similar
injuries will occur immediately to the other states should a court not
decide the case on the merits. Those hardships are both qualitative and
quantifiable.
Thus, it is not surprising that no lower federal court has concluded that
litigation challenging the President Trump’s invocation of emergency
power raise nonjusticiable political questions. Although the Court may
properly defer to the president foreign affairs cases or to Congress in the
a pure domestic relations context, and short term funding diversions will
escape judicial scrutiny on mootness grounds, the federal courts will
decided the legality of multi-billion dollar multiyear funding
diversions.248
CONCLUSION
It has been long settled that presidential power must stem from an act
of Congress or from the president’s executive power under the
Constitution. That understanding need not embrace the view that the
245. Id. at 2499–500 (citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 291 (2004)).
246. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Cmty., 461 U.S. 190, 190–
91 (1983) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)).
247. California v. Trump Complaint, supra note 127, at 7.
248. But see Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2404 (2018) (holding in a 5-4 Supreme Court
ruling that the president had authority under two statutes to ban from the United States Muslims
who lacked “credible claims” of a relationship with a United States national or entity).
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president does not have flexibility to carry out her responsibilities
whether they are based on explicit constitutional provisions or implicit
claims related to the effective discharge of enumerated powers. 249
But here, the president has no constitutional safe harbor. Congress
expressly declined to provide funding for the wall on two occasions. The
statutory sources that the president cited do not support justification his
national emergency declaration. Thus, the president’s use of
congressionally appropriated funds to build the wall is in conflict with
Congress’s will and the president has failed to “take care” that the laws
were “faithfully executed.”250
Under Youngstown, the president cannot proceed except in reliance on
his independent powers. Neither the foreign affairs power to recognize
nations nor the commander in chief authority to repel sudden attacks
authorize the president to spend funds appropriated by Congress for other
purposes to build the wall on the United States-Mexico border.
Ultimately, courts will conclude that the president has unconstitutionally
usurped Congress’s spending power to fulfill his campaign promise to
build the wall.

249. Erwin Chemerinsky, Controlling Inherent Presidential Power: Providing a Framework
for Judicial Review, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 863, 883 (1983).
250. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588 (1952) (“The President's
order does not direct that a congressional policy be executed in a manner prescribed by Congress—
it directs that a presidential policy be executed in a manner prescribed by the President.”); id. at
633 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Section 3 also provides that the President ‘shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed.’ But, as Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Frankfurter point out, the
power to execute the laws starts and ends with the laws Congress has enacted.”); id. at 646–55
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“The third clause in which the Solicitor General finds seizure powers is
that ‘he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . .’ That authority must be matched
against words of the Fifth Amendment that ‘No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law . . . .’ One gives a governmental authority that reaches so far
as there is law, the other gives a private right that authority shall go no farther. These signify about
all there is of the principle that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and that we submit
ourselves to rulers only if under rules. . . . The executive action we have here originates in the
individual will of the President and represents an exercise of authority without law.”). Compare
Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677–78 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (affirming that Obama’s
authorization of deferred action undocumented immigrants children violated the Administrative
Procedure Act), with Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam
by an equally divided court, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). See also Andrew Kent,
Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution and Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV.
2111, 2192 ( 2019) (“But our findings here at least suggest that the President—by original design—
is supposed to be like a fiduciary, who must pursue the public interest in good faith republican
fashion rather than pursuing his self-interest, and who must diligently and steadily execute
Congress's commands.”).
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EPILOGUE: STAY IN YOUR LANE
The ultimate question may not be the question of whether the
president’s actions are legal, but whether the courts can—and should—
find that these issues can be resolved in the courts rather than through the
political process. So far, the lower courts have all found that plaintiffs
had standing, that the claims were ripe, and, by focusing discretely on
whether the president’s acts are within the statutory provision, the claims
were not political questions. Yet, as the litigation continues to unfold in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the United
States Supreme Court, the questions presented include not simply
whether the reprogramming action is legal, but whether it is subject to
judicial review, who or what entities may make those claims, and whether
judicial disposition will prevent or enable unlawful actions by the
executive branch.
A. California v. Trump
In California v. Trump, with which the lawsuit Sierra Club case had
been consolidated,251 eighteen states initially challenged the
reprogramming of funds for the El Paso sector Project 1 portion of the
wall.252 On May 24, 2019, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California concluded that the reprograming exceeded
the president’s authority.253
Defendants argue that “Congress never denied DoD funding to
undertake the [Section] 284 projects at issue,” Opp. at 20, such that
Section 8005 and Section 2214(b) are satisfied. But in the Court's view,
that reading of those sections is likely wrong, when the reality is that
Congress was presented with—and declined to grant—a $5.7 billion
request for border barrier construction. Border barrier construction,
expressly, is the item Defendants now seek to fund via the Section 8005
transfer, and Congress denied the requested funds for that item. . . . It
thus would be inconsistent with the purpose of these provisions, and
would subvert “the difficult judgments reached by Congress”. . . to
allow Defendants to circumvent Congress's clear decision to deny the
border barrier funding sought here.254

251. Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 685 (9th Cir. 2019).
252. Compare California v. Trump Complaint, supra note 127, at 1, with California v. Trump,
379 F. Supp. 3d 928, 935–36 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (noting that the original complaint had sixteen states
and the District of Columbia but by the time the court consolidated there were twenty states not
including the District of Columbia).
253. California v. Trump, 379 F. Supp 3d at 945–46.
254. Id. at 946.
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The Court also concluded that the Defendant’s would be unlikely to
establish that the need for a wall was based on an “unforeseen military
requirement.”255
Defendants' argument that the need for the requested border barrier
construction funding was "unforeseen" cannot logically be squared with
the Administration's multiple requests for funding for exactly that
purpose dating back to at least early 2018. . . . [In] February 2018 [the
administration made a] White House Budget Request describing “the
Administration's proposal for $18 billion to fund the border wall”. . . ,
failed bills . . . , [and] December 11, 2018 transcript from a meeting
with members of Congress, where the President stated that “if we don't
get what we want [for border barrier construction funding], one way or
the other—whether it's through you, through a military, through
anything you want to call [sic]—I will shut down the government.”256

The Court denied without prejudice the States’ motion for a
preliminary injunction, and set a date less than two weeks later for a case
management conference to plan for resolution of the case on the merits.
After the Secretary of Defense announced on May 10, 2019, that the
Pentagon would re-program $1.5 billion in funding Congress
appropriated for security in Afghanistan to build a border wall in Tucson,
Arizona and in El Centro, Texas,257 the California v. Trump state
plaintiffs expanded their motion for summary judgment to include this
reprogramming as well.258 The court in California v. Trump relied on its
finding that the president exceeded his statutory authority in connection
with the El Paso Sector to reach an identical conclusion with respect to
the new reprogramming.
The Court previously only considered Defendants' reprogramming and
subsequent use of funds for border barrier construction for El Paso
Sector Project 1. It did not consider Defendants' more-recently
announced reprogramming and subsequent diversion of funds for
border barrier construction for the El Centro Sector Project, pending
further development of the record as to this project. . . . Defendants . . .
present no new evidence or argument for why the Court should depart
from its prior decision, and it will not. The Court thus stands by its prior
finding that Defendants' proposed interpretation of the statute is
unreasonable, and agrees with Plaintiffs that Defendants' intended
reprogramming of funds . . . to the Section 284 account for border
255. Id. at 947.
256. Id.
257. Robert Burns, Pentagon Shifting $1.5 Billon to Border Wall Construction, ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(May
10,
2019),
https://apnews.com/fde3f382fb1943e69d773eaac9f75eb1
[https://perma.cc/XMP7-9B3Y] (discussing that the $1.5 billion in funds was “originally targeted
for support of the Afghan security forces”).
258. California v. Trump, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 944 n.9.
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barrier construction is unlawful . . . . Because no new factual or legal
arguments persuade the Court that its analysis in the preliminary
injunction order was wrong, Plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the
merits has ripened into actual success. The Court accordingly grants
Plaintiffs' request for declaratory judgment that such use of funds
reprogrammed . . . for El Paso Sector Project 1 and El Centro Sector
Project is unlawful.259

B. Sierra Club v. Trump
1. In the Northern District of California
In Sierra Club v. Trump, in which environmental plaintiffs in sought a
preliminary injunction to halt wall construction, the Northern District of
California also found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their
claim that the president was acting ultra vires because of § 8005’s
requirements.260 The court found that the plaintiffs had “shown a
likelihood of success as to their argument that Congress previously
denied ‘the item for which funds [were] requested,’ precluding the
proposed transfer.”261 Because the president asked Congress for $5.7
billion, and Congress did not grant that amount in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, the plaintiffs were likely to show that “Congress
denied funding, and that [the reprogramming] thus [ran] afoul of the plain
language of § 8005.”262 Second, the court found that the plaintiffs were
likely to succeed on a claim that the president failed to meet the
“unforeseen military requirement” of § 8005.263 Refusing the president’s
argument that the “unforeseen” events “did not arise until February 2019,
when DHS requested support from [Department of Defense] to construct
fencing in drug trafficking corridors,” the court found that the “argument
that the need for the requested border barrier construction funding was
‘unforeseen’ cannot logically be squared with the Administration’s
multiple requests for funding for exactly that purpose dating back to at
least early 2018.”264
The Northern District of California also found that challenges to the
president’s authority under § 2808 had a likelihood of success.265
259. Id. at 941–52.
260. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
at 27, Sierra Club v. Trump, No. 19-CV-00892 (N.D. Cal 2019), 2019 WL 2715422, at *27
[hereinafter Sierra Club Preliminary Injunction Order] (noting that the order granting injunctive
relief held plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their first claim).
261. Id. at 32.
262. Id. at 33.
263. Id. at 34–36.
264. Id. at 35.
265. Id. at 42.
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Congress has defined the term “military construction” to “include[] any
construction, development, conversion, or extension of any kind carried
out with respect to military installation, whether to satisfy temporary or
permanent requirements, or any acquisition of land or construction of a
defense access road.”266 “Military installation” is in turn defined as:
[A] base, camp, post, station, yard, center, or other activity under the
jurisdiction of the Secretary of a military department or, in the case of
an activity in a foreign country, under the operational control of the
Secretary of a military department or the Secretary of Defense, without
regard to the duration of operational control.267

The president argued that although the statute defines both “military
construction” and “military installation,” both terms broadly define
“military construction as ‘includ[ing] (but not limited to . . . ) construction
with respect to a military installation, and defin[e] military installation to
include non-specified ‘other activity.’”268 The president therefore
claimed that these broad definitions “are not the kind of clear and
mandatory statutory language that is a necessary predicate to an ultra
vires claim.”269
Casting these arguments aside, the court found that under “traditional
tools of statutory construction,” the statute “likely precludes treating the
southern border as an ‘other activity’” qualifying for military
construction treatment.270 “Other activity,” the court reasoned, must be
read in conjunction with “the company it keeps”—that is, with the words
“base, camp, post, station, yard, center,” and “defense access road.”271
Otherwise, the statute would be “so broad as to transform literally any
activity conducted by a Secretary of a military department into a ‘military
installation,’” and there “would have been no reason to include a list of
specific, discrete military locations.”272 The Northern District of
California thus found that the president acted outside of his authority
under § 2808. Importantly, the court not address the substantive validity
of the president’s declaration under the NEA.273

266. 10 U.S.C. § 2801(a) (2018).
267. Id.
268. Sierra Club Preliminary Injunction Order, supra note 260, at 43.
269. Id.
270. See id. at 43 (noting that the court dedicated one sentence to this argument before reaching
the merits of the claim, and that the “defendants misunderstand the standard for ultra vires review”).
271. Id.
272. Id. at 45.
273. Order on Plaintiff’s Motion For Summary Judgment at 12, Sierra Club v. Trump, 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108933 at 12, No. 19-CV-00892, (N.D. Cal., June 28, 2019) [hereinafter Sierra
Club Summary Judgment Order].
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The court did grant a permanent injunction enjoining the Trump
Administration from diverting funds after ruling that the public’s interest
in “ensuring that statutes enacted by their representatives are not
imperiled by executive fiat” outweighs the public’s “‘weighty’ interest
‘in efficient administration of the immigration laws at the border.”274 The
court emphasized that “Congress considered all of [the Administration’s]
proffered needs for border barrier construction, weighed the public
interest in such construction against [the Administration’s] request for
taxpayer money, and struck what it considered to be the proper balance—
in the public’s interest—by making available only $1.375 billion in
funding.”275
2. In the Ninth Circuit
In the Ninth Circuit, whether Courts should resolve these claims arose
and took center stage alongside the merits.276 The Ninth Circuit took
pains to identify the issues not before the court:
Before turning to the merits, we highlight what is not at issue in end,
this appeal. First, Defendants at oral argument acknowledged that they
are “not challenging [Article III] standing for purposes of the stay
motion.” Thus, Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs have suffered
an “actual or imminent,” “concrete and particularized,” “injury in fact”
that is “fairly traceable” to Defendants’ actions and that will “likely” be
“redressed by a favorable decision.” We have satisfied ourselves that
Defendants’ assessment is correct. Plaintiffs have alleged enough to
satisfy the requirements for standing under Article III at this stage of
the litigation.277

In contrast, the president’s lawyers argued that district court decision
was an inappropriate “‘intrusion into the budgeting process’ which ‘is
between the legislative and executive branches—not the judiciary.’”278
The Ninth Circuit majority responded with authority dating to Marbury
v. Madison,279 an indication that the issue presented was about much
more than Congress’ authority over appropriations but about the role of
the judiciary in the resolution of a dispute over the performance of a duty
Congress has assigned to the executive branch.280 In the Ninth Circuit’s
words:
Chief Justice Marshall’s answer to “whether the legality of an act of the
head of a department be examinable in a court of justice” or “only
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 27 (citations omitted).
Id. at 29.
Id. at 30–31.
Id. at 30.
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politically examinable” remains the same: “[W]here a specific duty is
assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of
that duty, . . . the individual who considers himself injured, has a right
to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.” Pursuant to its
exclusive power of appropriation, Congress imposed on the Executive
Branch a duty—contained in section 8005—not to transfer funds unless
certain circumstances were present. As discussed above, . . . Defendants
have not disputed that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged injuries that
satisfy Article III’s standing requirement to enable them to pursue this
action. Although “our decision may have significant political overtones,
courts cannot avoid their responsibility merely ‘because the issues have
political implications.’” In sum, it is appropriate for this action to
proceed in federal court.281

There were several arguments that the judiciary lacked the power to
intervene. One argument was grounded on a difference of opinion as to
whether Department of Defense § 8005 barred the transfer. The Ninth
Circuit concluded that it was so barred under the circumstances.
Another question was whether the district court injunction ought to be
stayed because the plaintiffs had no right to seek judicial review of the
reprogramming decision.282 If they did not have such a right, then they
had no likelihood of success on the merits, the Government was likely to
prevail, and the district court injunction ought to be stayed.
Ultimately, the debate over this issue took center stage in the Ninth
Circuit decision whether to block the district court’s injunction against
the use of the Department of Defense funds for wall construction.
One disagreement focused on whether the Sierra Club’s claim was
statutory or constitutional. The majority concluded that the claim was
based on the Appropriations clause and thus Constitutional in nature.283
Another question was whether § 8005 permitted the reprogramming. The
majority agreed with the district court that § 8005 did not permit the
reprogramming.284
The second key question, answered in the affirmative by the district
court and the Ninth Circuit and in the negative by the dissent, was
whether the Sierra Club’s interests were within the “zone of interests”
281. Id. at 30–31 (citations and internal cross-references omitted).
282. Id. at 9.
283. Id. at 33.
284. Id. at 40–44. The 9th Circuit majority also examined and rejected the possible argument
that the Department of Defense’s reprogramming decision was entitled to deference under Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and its progeny as a congressionally authorized
“agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute administered by the agency” or entitled to
deference based on the doctrine in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (citations omitted),
which permits judicial deference if the “agency’s reasoning is persuasive.”
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implicated by § 8005. The Ninth Circuit majority concluded that the
“zone of interests” tests was a limit on statutory based challenges, not
constitutional ones such as Sierra Club’s appropriations claims.285 The
majority agreed with the dissent that the “zone of interest” test was
applicable to the statutory claim of § 8005 violation, but concluded that
zone of interests encompassed not merely those embodied in the statute
allegedly violated but “claims about structural provisions of the
Constitution . . . [where] it has applied a very lenient version of that test,”
one the majority concluded that Sierra Club claim’s satisfied.286
Accordingly, if Plaintiffs must fall within a zone of interests served by
the constitutional provision they seek to vindicate, we are persuaded
that they do. The Appropriations Clause is a vital instrument of
separation of powers, which has as its aim the protection of individual
rights and liberties—not merely separation for separation's sake . . .
Because “individuals, too, are protected by the operations of separation
of powers and checks and balances,” it follows that “they are not
disabled from relying on those principles in otherwise justiciable cases
and controversies.”287

In contrast, the dissent concluded that, under Dalton v. Specter,
“claims simply alleging that the President has exceeded his statutory
authority are not ‘constitutional’ claims, subject to judicial review,”288
because the president is not an agency and Congress has not otherwise
provided for judicial review.289The dissent’s distinction between a
statutory claim and a constitutional claim was integral to its conclusion
that Sierra Club had no right of action. The dissent concluded that the
plaintiff had no “implied right of action” because Congress did not intend
to create a judicial remedy for violations of § 8005.290
The dissent agreed that the reprogramming actions of the Department
could be the subject to APA review, but that the Sierra Club’s interest did
not “fall within the zone of interests protected by [§ 8005] . . . .”291 In
contrast to the majority, which considered constitutional interests that lay
beyond the four corners of § 8005 relevant, the dissent concluded that the
transfer of funds did not affect the Sierra Club’s aesthetic, recreational,
and environmental interests, nor did § 8005 require that the Department
of Defense consider those interests before making transfers.292 To be
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Sierra Club Summary Judgment Order, supra note 273, at 55–62.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 63–64 (citations omitted).
Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 473 (1994).
Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 707 (9th Cir. 2019) (Smith J., dissenting).
Id. at 712.
Id. at 712–14.
Id. at 714–15.
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sure, the dissent agreed that § 8005 arguably protects Congress and those
who would have been entitled to funds as originally appropriated.293 It
also agreed the statute arguably protects economic interests in the use of
the funds as originally appropriated.294 Damning to Sierra Club, the
dissent concluded that “[p]laintiffs interests are only ‘marginally related
to . . . the purposes implicit in the statute [such] that it cannot reasonably
be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit . . . .”295
3. The Supremes
In a tersely worded one paragraph unsigned opinion on July 26, 2019,
a divided Supreme Court agreed to stay the June 28, 2019 district court
decision, upheld by the Ninth Circuit, that had permanently enjoined the
president and the Defense Department from using reprogrammed
Department of Defense funds to build the wall.296 The rational was “that
the Government has made a sufficient showing at this stage that the
plaintiffs have no cause of action to obtain review of the Acting
Secretary’s compliance with § 8005.”297 The stay would remain in place
until the litigation until the Ninth Circuit ruled on the merits and
throughout any further Supreme Court litigation.298
Justice Breyer concurred in part and dissented in part from the grant of
the stay.299 He noted that the “case raises novel and important questions
about the ability of private parties to enforce Congress’[s] appropriations
power,” but offered no view on those merits.300 Instead, his opinion
focused on the possibility that the stay might be tailored to avoid
irreparable harm to both parties—to the environmental interests of the
Sierra Club as well as to operational interests of the government in
finalizing the contracts necessary for the construction of the wall before

293. Id. at 715.
294. Id. at 714–15.
295. Id. at 715 (citing Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987)). A
coalition of environmental groups, led by the Center for Biological Diversity, challenged the
authority of DHS to waive dozens of laws, including the National Environmental Policy Act, the
Endangered Species Act, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, to make it easier to build the
border infrastructure. California Attorney General Xavier Becerra (D) also filed suit. In re Border
Infrastructure Envtl. Litig., 284 F. Supp. 3d 1092 (S.D. Cal. 2018).
296. Trump v. Sierra Club, 140 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2019). Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas,
Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh voted in favor of the stay, while Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan voted to deny the application. Id. Justice Breyer concurred in part and dissented in part. Id.
at 1–2.
297. Id. at 1.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
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the September 30th deadline to use those funds.301 His solution was to
grant the stay to permit the government to finalize its contracts so they
would be in place should the government ultimately prevail, but to deny
the stay of the injunction against wall construction to avoid irreparable
harm to environment and the Sierra Club.302
I can therefore find no justification for granting the stay in full . . . [but]
would grant the Government’s application to stay the injunction only to
the extent that the injunction prevents the Government from finalizing
the contracts or taking other preparatory administrative action, but leave
it in place insofar as it precludes the Government from disbursing those
funds or beginning construction.303

The Supreme Court’s cryptic disposition of the stay suggests several
possibilities for the ultimate resolution of the litigation. Should the
litigation return to the Court via a grant of certiorari, the stay language
signals that a majority is prepared to dispose of the case on what might
appear at first blush a narrow ground focused on the right of the Sierra
Club to seek judicial review of the reprogramming decision. That
resolution might focus on of whether Congress created a private right of
action to enforce § 8005. This approach might include an endorsement of
the view that private parties may not complain in court about executive
spending in violation of congressional directives unless Congress
explicitly or implicitly authorized those lawsuits. That majority could
avoid a discussion of the justiciability of executive branch-congressional
spending disputes, an argument the executive branch offered to Supreme
Court in its stay application.304 A slightly narrower approach, though still
consistent with an executive win, would be the “zone of interest”
approach endorsed by the Ninth Circuit dissent that the “reprograming
decision” itself did not affect the plaintiff.305 These are a few of the
possibilities presented by the four corners of the Stay Application, a
portion of which the cryptic Supreme Court stay decision seems to
endorse.306
In light of the Supreme Court stay of the district court injunction,
involving a relatively small portion of the funding needed for the wall
and the intervention of the Supreme Court, the resolution of this dispute
at this stage is a symbolic win for the Trump administration but not the

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Application for Stay at 25, Trump v. Sierra Club, 140 S. Ct. 1 (2019) (No. 19A-60).
Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 709 (9th Cir. 2019) (Smith, J., dissenting).
Id. at 4, 20–25.
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end of its potential trouble in the federal court.307 The injunction stayed
by the Supreme Court involved questions on the president’s funding
diversion activity pursuant to Section 8005. But the litigation continued
with respect to the president’s diversions under Section 2808 in the Sierra
Club companion case California v. Trump.308 There, on December 11,
2019, the district court concluded that the president did not have authority
under Section 2808 to “redirect military construction funds to the eleven
border barrier projects . . . .” 309 And the legal skirmishes continue.310
In the near term, the ball for control over the wall is in Congress’s
court. Congress continues to fund humanitarian efforts on the border,311
while Court has provided and opportunity for the president to claim a
victory in a battle while the war continues in the federal courts.312 Thus
even though lower Courts agree that the president acted unlawfully in his
reprogramming of Defense Department funds, the Supreme Court stay of
Sierra Club in effect permits the president to finalize contracts and begin
wall construction pending the resolution of the dispute on the merits in
the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court. And in its short decision
granting the stay, the Supreme Court signaled that if the case arrives via
certiorari and the Court grants review, a majority will likely conclude that
those plaintiffs have no cause of action. Thus, though courts have so far
concluded that the president has unlawfully usurped Congress’s spending
power to fulfill his campaign promise to build the wall, the favorable
outcome for the president may ultimately turn on the nature of the
litigants, not the constitutionality or legality of the president’s decision.
For those concerned with the stature of constitutional limitations on the
executive, hope is alive.
307. Trump v. Sierra Club, 140 S. Ct. 1 (2019) (mem.).
308. See California v. Trump, 407 F. Supp. 3d 869 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
309. Id. at 898–99.
310. In El Paso Cty. v. Trump, 407 F. Supp. 3d 655 (W.D. Tex. 2019), a district court declined
to stay its prior decision that the president had no authority to build a Texas portion of his wall
under Section 2808, Id. at 658, and entered a permanent injunction. Id. at 667. The Fifth Circuit
stayed the district court injunction, relying on the Supreme Court stay in Sierra Club. El Paso Cty.
v. Trump, No. 19-51144, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 567, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 8, 2020).
311. See 107 CONG. REC. H5085 (daily ed. June 25, 2019) (noting that Democratic leadership
was considering H.R. 3401, which provided $4.5 billion in humanitarian assistance, but expressly
declined the use of those funds for the wall).
312. After the stay decision, the president tweeted “Wow! Big VICTORY on the Wall. The
United States Supreme Court overturns lower court injunction, allows Southern Border Wall to
proceed. Big WIN for Border Security and the Rule of Law!” Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2019, 5:37 PM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/
status/1154883345546928128 [https://perma.cc/NMG7-FH6N].
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The Ninth Circuit had concluded its opinion with this observation:
In his concurrence in Youngstown, Justice Jackson made eloquent
comments that seem equally apt today:
. . . The executive action we have here originates in the individual
will of the President and represents an exercise of authority without
law. . . . With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have
discovered no technique for long preserving free government
except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made
by parliamentary deliberations. Such institutions may be destined
to pass away. But it is the duty of the Court to be last, not first, to
give them up.313

There is an old adage that a half a loaf is better than none at all. That
option may be satisfy a starving person, but it won’t sate the hunger of a
nation for the rule of law.

313. Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 707 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).

